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TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION AS A
“GREAT POWER”
DANIEL RICE†
ABSTRACT
The Roberts Court has recently begun reviving a long-latent
structural constitutional principle—that some unenumerated powers
are too important to be inferred through the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Under this abstractly sensible theory, some powers are too
“great” to have been conferred by implication alone. This structural
logic seems poised to command majority holdings in the Supreme
Court. But it is largely unclear what results so undertheorized a
concept might dictate. Now is the time to survey the domain of “great
powers” in service of developing an appropriately modest and
judicially enforceable great-powers doctrine.
This Note argues that a power to annex foreign territory is too
important to be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Because the Constitution does not enumerate a territorial-acquisition
power, Congress therefore disregarded great-powers limitations in
annexing Texas and Hawaii through joint resolution. Congressional
Globe debates from 1845 reveal that opponents of annexing Texas
boldly anticipated this very argument. This Note explores their
forgotten constitutional claim in the course of highlighting
annexation’s historical pedigree as a great power.
Rethinking the constitutional basis for territorial expansion
demonstrates that judges cannot apply great-powers principles
consistently. And previously overlooked congressional annexation
rhetoric supplies fresh diagnostic tools for identifying other great
powers, allowing scholars to escape deceptively stale search terms. In
fact, this Note marks the first attempt to identify a federal statute
struck down on great-powers grounds: the Court’s decision in
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Afroyim v. Rusk can be fairly read as holding that involuntary
expatriation is too important a power to be inferred through the
Necessary and Proper Clause.

INTRODUCTION
Under traditional understandings of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Congress enjoys virtually boundless authority to choose how
1
best to effectuate its enumerated powers. But in his 2012 National
2
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts recognized a core set of powers that may not be implied to
carry out Congress’s explicit power grants. He explained that
although Congress may exercise “incidental powers” under the
3
Necessary and Proper Clause, that clause does not warrant “the
exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond
4
those specifically enumerated.” In other words, some powers are too
important to be exercised merely through implication, even if they
might be the most convenient means imaginable for executing
5
Congress’s enumerated powers. These so-called “great powers” are
off limits to Congress unless the Constitution specifically mentions

1. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“[I]n determining whether
the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular
federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related
to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”); Evan H. Caminker,
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2001)
(“The question . . . is simply whether the congressional measure facilitates or assists in some
meaningful sense the effective implementation of a primary power.”); Jennifer Mason
McAward, McCulloch and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (2012)
(“Since the New Deal, the standard reading of McCulloch [v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)] emphasizes Congress’s wide latitude in choosing the means by which to effectuate its
enumerated powers and posits that the Court must accord near-complete deference to those
choices.”).
2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. Id. at 2591 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
4. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411).
5. See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J.
1738, 1749 (2013) (“[S]ome powers are so great, so important, or so substantive, that we should
not assume that they were granted by implication, even if they might help effectuate an
enumerated power.”); id. at 1752 (“If the power was important enough, it was one that the
Constitution would be expected to grant explicitly, if at all.”); Brief of Federalism Scholars as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor at 15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Brief of Federalism Scholars] (“The Necessary and Proper
Clause . . . does not grant all conceivable implicit powers that could be useful to an enumerated
power; it does not grant powers we would expect the Constitution to enumerate separately.”).
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6

them. Roberts reiterated this conceptual bombshell in his United
7
8
States v. Kebodeaux concurrence the very next Term.
Long before NFIB, Chief Justice Marshall introduced Roberts’s
structural precept in the Supreme Court’s earliest (and greatest)
exposition of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper
9
Clause—McCulloch v. Maryland. The Court has never repudiated
Marshall’s distinction between “great substantive and independent
10
11
power[s]” and “incidental powers.” Yet because that language so
12
rarely appeared in later opinions, the great-powers concept seemed
13
to fall from the sky in 2012. And not in any ordinary constitutional
case: Roberts opined that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s)
14
minimum-coverage provision, which one scholar has called “the
most significant change to the American social contract since the

6. See Baude, supra note 5, at 1749 (“These powers, sometimes called ‘great powers,’ are
the kinds of powers we would expect the Constitution to mention if they were granted.”). The
structural concept of great powers resembles a statutory-interpretation device familiar to
administrative lawyers: that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
7. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
8. See infra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
9. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. Id. at 411.
11. Id. at 421.
12. Only two post-McCulloch, pre-NFIB Supreme Court opinions even quote Marshall’s
“great substantive and independent” phrase: Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5,
46 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting), and Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529
(1894).
13. As Professor Andrew Koppelman writes, “The distinction between a ‘great substantive
and independent power’ and lesser powers, on the other hand, was ignored until the ACA case.
That language is only quoted in two nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases between
McCulloch and NFIB, both upholding congressional power.” Andrew Koppelman, “Necessary,”
“Proper,” and Health Care Reform, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 105, 109 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Health Care Reform]; see also Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Everybody:
Lawson and Kopel on Health Care Reform and Originalism, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 515, 517
(2012) [hereinafter Koppelman, Everybody] (“For nearly 200 years, the federal government has
taken on ever larger responsibilities without reference to these limits, which had been
forgotten.”); Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2080
(2014) (characterizing NFIB’s great-powers analysis as “the sudden appearance of a new
distinction in the case law”); Michael C. Dorf, What Really Happened in the Affordable Care Act
Case, 92 TEX. L. REV. 133, 150 (2013) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK
CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM (2013)) (claiming that
McCulloch’s “great substantive and independent” language “had previously been almost
entirely ignored”).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
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15

Great Society programs of the 1960s,” could not be sustained under
the Necessary and Proper Clause. A power to compel individuals to
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty—the ability to create
commerce, rather than regulate preexisting commerce—would be
16
constitutionally great, incapable of being claimed inferentially.
Critics of the great-powers idea have underscored its dubious
administrability: At what point, precisely, does a power become too
important to be left to implication? Justice Ginsburg has suggested
that judges lack the analytical tools to conclude that Congress has
exercised an “independent” and “substantive” power, or else a
17
“derivative” and “incidental” one. Roberts had effectively assured
18
lower courts that “[y]ou will know it when you see it.” More
cynically, Professor Andrew Koppelman insists that the “great
substantive and independent power” label is simply a placeholder for
the “interpreter’s pretheoretical intuitions about which government
19
powers are particularly scary.” Roberts’s strange inquiry “take[s] us
20
into terra incognita” and would unsettle much black-letter
21
constitutional law.

15. Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms the Social Contract, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE:
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, supra note 13, at 11, 12.
16. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
17. Id. at 2627–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Appointments Clause jurisprudence
reinforces Ginsburg’s line-drawing concern. The Constitution explicitly distinguishes between
“principal” and “inferior” executive officers, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2, but the Court has
struggled to conceptualize “greatness” in this context. Compare Edmond v. United States, 520
U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (“Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a
superior.”), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988) (“[F]actors relating to the ‘ideas of
tenure, duration . . . and duties’ of the independent counsel are sufficient to establish that
appellant is an ‘inferior’ officer in the constitutional sense.” (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted)). As Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, acknowledged, “The line between
‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little
guidance into where it should be drawn.” Id. at 671. So too with the line between great and
incidental powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
18. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19. Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 118.
20. Id. at 113.
21. See Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 10–11 (2011) [hereinafter Koppelman, Mail
Robbers] (“These new rules would, if consistently applied, randomly blow up large parts of the
U.S. Code.”); Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 517 (“The[] logic [of great powers]
implies the greatest revolution in federal power in American history. . . . Lawson and Kopel do
not merely want to burn the house to roast the pig. They are ready to torch the whole city.”);
Dorf, supra note 13, at 151 (“[T]o adopt th[is] . . . methodology would be to invalidate a good
deal more than purchase mandates.”). Koppelman, writing before NFIB, was critiquing the
claims of Gary Lawson and David Kopel, two scholars who had argued that the ACA’s
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These are legitimate concerns. Professor William Baude began to
grapple with them in a groundbreaking article published soon after
22
Baude takes the know-it-when-you-see-it objection
NFIB.
23
seriously, because “we do not have anything approaching a clear test
for deciding whether each particular unenumerated power is
24
incidental or great or somewhere in between.” But he does believe
that the legal community can develop an appropriately modest,
judicially enforceable great-powers doctrine. Declining to reason
exclusively from first principles, Baude would have judges proceed
“inductively”—that is, heeding “specific evidence about powers that
seem to have been thought great, either at the Founding or in post25
ratification thought and practice.” He hopes that “further

minimum-coverage provision was not merely “incidental” to the Commerce power and was too
important to be exercised through implication. See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
22. Baude, supra note 5. Baude intriguingly posits that Congress’s long-established power
to condemn land in the states was originally (and widely) assumed to be too important to exist
without enumeration. Id. at 1741. He also identifies the doctrines of commandeering, state
sovereign immunity, military conscription, and freedom of the press as fertile ground for greatpowers scholarship. Id. at 1744; see also Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1875–76 (2012) (speculating that a power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity might be too important to have been granted implicitly).
23. See Baude, supra note 5, at 1810 n.405 (expressing his “basic sympathy with
Koppelman and Justice Ginsburg on the vagueness point”).
24. Id. at 1810; see also MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE
ROBERTS COURT 17 (2013) (claiming that Roberts’s “opinion gets fuzzy” when it addresses the
individual mandate’s constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause); David Kopel,
Postscript, in A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY AND THE
HEALTH CARE CASE 261, 264 (Randy E. Barnett et al. eds., 2013) (conceding that “reasonable
people can differ about the right result” when applying great-powers principles); LaCroix, supra
note 13, at 2080 (dismissing Roberts’s “vaguely defined” understanding of great powers); Neil S.
Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,” Legality, and Statesmanship, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, supra note
13, at 204 (“Roberts’s language is vague and difficult to apply.”); Dorf, supra note 13, at 151
(characterizing as “mysterious” the alleged distinction between great and incidental powers);
Ilya Somin, Is There a Federal Eminent Domain Power?, JOTWELL (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://conlaw.jotwell.com/is-there-a-federal-eminent-domain-power (“[M]uch more needs to be
said about how we should draw the line between incidental powers and great and independent
ones.”).
25. Baude, supra note 5, at 1810. In short, “the relative indeterminacy of the [Necessary
and Proper] Clause and the idea of great powers it incorporated lend themselves to a historical
inquiry focused on concrete practices.” Id. at 1808; see also Christian R. Burset, The Messy
History of the Federal Eminent Domain Power: A Response to William Baude, 4 CALIF. L. REV.
CIRCUIT 187, 188 (2013) (“Baude’s boldly revisionist account calls us to employ the [greatpowers] concept with greater historical specificity and analytical rigor.”). Baude predicts that a
power’s greatness will usually be too unclear to justify invalidating challenged legislation, but
not if “subsequent practice . . . adequately liquidates its [importance].” Baude, supra note 5, at
1812.
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scholarship may soon catalog more fully what powers were so
26
considered and why.”
This Note takes up Baude’s invitation. It argues that annexation
of foreign territory is exactly the sort of power that is too important
to be left to implication through the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Constitution enumerates no congressional territorial-acquisition
power, yet the United States has twice—and only twice—acquired
27
28
foreign land statutorily : the annexations of Texas (in 1845) and
29
Hawaii (in 1898). Each time, annexationists introduced a joint
resolution only after failing to secure enough votes to ratify a duly
30
negotiated treaty. Perhaps uniform reliance on the treaty process
before and between these famous outliers amounts to the kind of
31
“clear historical practice” Baude would require for judicial
invalidation on great-powers grounds. Perhaps congressional
32
constitutional objections to Texas’s annexation, relying critically on
the notion of great powers, are the sort of “post-ratification
33
thought” that can enhance annexation’s historical pedigree as a
great power. But in any case, the example of annexation confirms that
scholars should not despair of achieving consensus while reasoning
deductively about great powers. Considered entirely in the abstract,
34
territorial acquisition—like levying taxes or declaring war —is

26. Baude, supra note 5, at 1811.
27. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential Proclamation
To Extend the Territorial Sea, 1 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 1, 19 (1990) (identifying the annexations of
Texas and Hawaii as the “two instances in which the United States acquired territory by
legislative action”). Kmiec’s article was originally written as a formal Office of Legal Counsel
opinion. Id. at 1.
28. Joint Resolution for the Admission of the State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th
Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1845).
29. Joint Resolution To Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States,
J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
30. See infra notes 149, 226 and accompanying text.
31. Baude, supra note 5, at 1818. As the Court recently concluded in the context of recess
appointments, “when considered against 200 years of settled practice, we regard [a] few
scattered examples as anomalies.” Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2567 (2014).
32. For an overview of these unheeded objections, see infra Part II.A.
33. Baude, supra note 5, at 1810.
34. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (classifying these
enumerated powers, among others, as “great powers”). Marshall presumably meant that these
powers could not have been exercised through implication had they not been enumerated. I
take no position on whether every enumerated congressional power is properly regarded as a
great power because of its enumeration. See also Baude, supra note 5, at 1754–55 (“This is not
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precisely the sort of power that seems too great and substantive to be
35
used as a means of fulfilling express power grants.
Part I of this Note traces the Necessary and Proper Clause’s
relationship with the idea of great versus incidental powers. It builds
on other scholars’ work to connect the Clause’s original meaning,
early debates on the constitutionality of the proposed Bank of the
United States, Chief Justice Marshall’s McCulloch opinion, and Chief
Justice Roberts’s surprising resurrection of the great-powers concept
in NFIB and Kebodeaux.
Part II makes an affirmative case for territorial annexation as a
“great substantive and independent power.” It features forgotten
congressional great-powers rhetoric that demonstrates how the
36
concept “can be useful in nonjudicial constitutional interpretation,”
even if judges might disagree on borderline applications.
Congressional opponents of annexing Texas generated the most
striking evidence I have found of a legislative body’s reasoning about
the idea of great powers. Fifty-three years later, opponents of
annexing Hawaii chose to distinguish (rather than dispute) the
precedent of annexing Texas and immediately admitting it to
37
statehood. They thereby deprived themselves of the ability to
characterize annexation as a great power, since the Constitution
apparently did permit statutory annexation under certain
circumstances. But their crusade against “powers inherent in
38
sovereignty” furnished constitutional scholars with a useful
diagnostic tool: when a congressional power can be defended only on
such flimsy extraconstitutional grounds, it is an especially fine
candidate for great-power status.
Part III considers two consequences of the argument presented
in Part II. First, if territorial annexation is too important to be
inferred from some other power, the great-powers doctrine simply
to say that every explicitly enumerated power is a great one that could not otherwise be implied
. . . .”).
35. My argument extends to all statutory annexations, regardless of the acquired
territory’s square mileage. Declaring war does not cease to be a great power if the belligerents
clash once and call it quits; levying taxes is constitutionally “great” even if Congress exacts
trifling sums. Likewise, this Note argues, all forms of legislative annexation necessarily exceed
congressional competencies.
36. Baude, supra note 5, at 1810.
37. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
38. I borrow this term from Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1, passim (2002).
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cannot be applied consistently. Much as some judicial originalists
39
avowedly make “pragmatic exception[s]” to their methodology for
entrenched constitutional settlements achieved outside Article V, no
judge will ever use Texas’s or Hawaii’s unconstitutionality as a
premise in constitutional decisionmaking. So judges who deploy
Roberts’s (and Marshall’s) doctrine of great versus incidental powers
must be prepared to explain why they should sometimes decline to
follow their best understanding of the Constitution.
Second, congressional debates about territorial annexation
demonstrate that constitutional actors are capable of reflecting on
great powers without using Marshall’s familiar “great substantive and
independent” phraseology. Scholars should therefore parse Supreme
Court opinions more carefully before asserting that the great-powers
idea simply disappeared from constitutional adjudication (if not
40
constitutional discourse) for nearly two hundred years. Indeed, this
Note marks the first attempt to identify a federal statute struck down
41
on great-powers grounds: Afroyim v. Rusk can be fairly read as
holding that involuntary expatriation is too important a power to be
42
inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause.
I. OF BANKS AND MANDATES
The great-powers principle enjoys a rich intellectual heritage,
and Chief Justice Roberts has begun to restore its place in
constitutional law. This Part examines early understandings of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Marshall’s pathbreaking
implementation of great powers in McCulloch, and the Roberts
Court’s growing fascination with the idea as a leading principle of
structural constitutional law.
A. The Intellectual Origins of Great Powers
A group of historically minded scholars has persuasively argued
that the Necessary and Proper Clause—which was drafted by five
39. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).
40. See John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 59 n.349 (2014) (“[I]n no case has the Court ever invalidated an act of Congress on the
ground that it employed a ‘great substantive and independent power,’ in contravention of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
41. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
42. See infra notes 308–21 and accompanying text.
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legally skilled public servants who “th[ought] of government
responsibilities in terms of agency and other fiduciary
43
relationships” —embodied the agency-law doctrine of principal and
44
incidental powers. An incidental power “had to be less important or
less valuable than its [enumerated] principal,” and also “subordinate
45
to or dependent on the principal.” Thus, an implied power cannot be
46
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” an enumerated
power if it is more important or far-reaching than the explicitly
granted one. Only if an implied power is inferior (that is, incidental)
to its principal may an interpreter then ask whether it is sufficiently
47
adapted to effectuate the principal.
Even Koppelman, the most outspoken critic of the great-powers
doctrine, seems to concede that the best understanding of the
Constitution—from both a historical and theoretical standpoint—is
that it requires some greater-and-lesser relationship between express
48
and implied powers. He disputes only that principle’s contemporary
administrability and the wisdom of adhering to it after an apparently

43. Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 84, 86 (2010).
44. See Baude, supra note 5, at 1750–51 (“[B]oth before and after ratification,
commentators repeatedly described the Necessary and Proper Clause as confirming established
principles of implicit or incidental powers. . . . Lawyers would thus have understood the words
‘necessary and proper’ to invoke the ‘incidental powers’ doctrine that had developed under
existing principles of law.”).
45. Natelson, supra note 43, at 52, 61.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
47. Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267, 273 (2011).
48. See Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 516 (“The book is a valuable
contribution, an original and enlightening exploration of the contemporaneous meaning of the
Clause.”); Koppelman, Mail Robbers, supra note 21, at 116 (granting that Lawson and Kopel’s
research “sure looks impressive”); see also John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1122 (2011) (reviewing LAWSON ET AL.,
supra note 43) (concluding that “the authors make a strong case” that the Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes only certain incidental powers); John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper
Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1371 (2012) (reviewing LAWSON ET AL.,
supra note 43) (“I have no problem concluding that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an
incidental powers clause.”). A decade earlier, Professor Caleb Nelson argued that “Marshall’s
concept of ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ reflects a sensible canon of
interpretation. . . . [Otherwise,] relatively small tails [could] wag some very big dogs.” Caleb
Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559,
1640 (2002) (first alteration in original).
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49

extended judicial dormancy. After all, the great-powers framework
50
explains why certain enumerations are not superfluous. And given
that Congress may also legislate to effectuate its implied powers—
even ones three steps removed from an associated enumerated
51
power —surely some structural limitation must exist to ensure that
doubly and triply derivative powers do not overshadow the
52
enumerated objects they obliquely serve.
In 1791, great-powers thinking underwent a lasting shift. The
First Congress debated whether to charter a Bank of the United
States as a corporation; once the bill passed, President Washington
53
solicited his cabinet’s formal legal advice on whether to sign it.
Because no enumerated power authorized Congress to create
54
financial instrumentalities, a national bank would have been
constitutional only if inferable through the Necessary and Proper
Clause. As these early explications revealed, the nation’s leading legal
thinkers understood that clause to distinguish between principal
55
(greater) and incidental (lesser) powers. And beyond merely
49. See Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 518 (“[I]t is not obvious how to translate
these terms from their then-familiar applications in property law or the law of corporations to
the very different context of governmental powers.”).
50. Congress’s powers to call out the militia and raise armies reinforce the power to
declare war, but each was explicitly mentioned in Article I. Baude, supra note 5, at 1752.
Likewise, “If Congress has all powers, great and small, that are helpful to carrying out its other
powers, then surely it would implicitly have a general power to tax already.” Id. at 1754.
51. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 147 (2010) (“[E]ven the dissent
acknowledges that Congress has the implied power to criminalize any conduct that might
interfere with the exercise of an enumerated power, and also the additional power to imprison
people who violate those (inferentially authorized) laws, and the additional power to provide
for the safe and reasonable management of those prisons, and the additional power to regulate
the prisoners’ behavior even after their release.” (emphases added)); id. at 148 (“[W]e must
reject [the] argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits no more than a single step
between an enumerated power and an Act of Congress.”).
52. See James Madison, Speech on Feb. 2, 1791, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL
BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 39, 42 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., 1832) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF THE BANK] (arguing that “Necessary and Proper” cannot mean merely
“conducive,” because “[i]f implications, thus remote, and thus multiplied, can be linked
together, a chain may be formed, that will reach every object . . . within the whole compass of
political economy”).
53. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 914 (1985).
54. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL WAR 103 (1957) (“There is nothing in the Constitution about banks and banking
. . . .”).
55. See Baude, supra note 5, at 1751–54 (recounting this constitutional debate through the
lens of principal and incidental powers).
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claiming that implied powers may not eclipse the enumerated powers
they help execute, these actors also assumed that some powers are too
important to have been granted by implication.
Representative James Madison, for example, argued that “the
degree of [a power’s] importance” determines “the probability or
56
improbability of its being left to construction.” Similarly, Attorney
General Edmund Randolph informed President Washington that
congressional powers “are either incidental, or substantive, that is,
57
independent powers.” Most conceivable powers need not be
expressly delegated, he reasoned, but “substantive and independent”
powers “would not otherwise have existed” had they not been
58
enumerated. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton also
endorsed this principle, arguing that “[t]he power to erect
corporations, is not to be considered as an independent and
substantive power, but as an incidental and auxiliary one; and was,
59
therefore, more properly left to implication, than expressly granted.”
In sum, Madison, Randolph, and Hamilton—the last of whom
60
even believed the Bank bill to be constitutional —all agreed that an
implied power’s perceived importance affects a federal statute’s
61
constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause. These
Founding-era bank debates, then, powerfully illustrate the greatpowers concept’s impressive intellectual ancestry. They also seem to
have permanently reconfigured great-powers thinking—instead of
asking whether an implied power reached more broadly than its
enumerated parent, the relevant inquiry became whether a power was
so important that it could not be exercised without itself being
enumerated.

56. Madison, supra note 52, at 40. Madison also insisted that the constitutional structure
“condemn[s] the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not
evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.” Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
57. Memorandum from Edmund Randolph, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to George
Washington, President of the U.S. (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra
note 52, at 89, 90.
58. Id.
59. Memorandum from Alexander Hamilton, Sec’y of the Treasury of the U.S., to George
Washington, President of the U.S. (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra
note 52, at 95, 105.
60. Baude, supra note 5, at 1752.
61. See William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
39, 42–43 (2014) (concluding that these “bank debates . . . t[ook] as common ground that the
Necessary and Proper Clause extended only to incidental powers, and not potentially great
ones”).

RICE IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

728

12/2/2014 10:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:717

B. Great Powers in the Marshall Court
In McCulloch, which sustained the constitutionality of the
62
Second Bank of the United States, these legal giants’ intuitions
about principal versus incidental powers acquired the force of
constitutional law. Chief Justice Marshall explained that some powers
are too important to have been granted to Congress by implication
63
64
alone. He styled these “great powers,” “great outlines,” “great
65
66
objects,”
“vast powers,”
powers “less usual, . . . of higher
67
dignity, . . . more requiring a particular specification,” powers
68
“distinct and independent,” and “great substantive and independent
69
power[s].”
The Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that Congress also
possesses an unspecifiable number of lesser powers to carry its
enumerated grants into execution. These lesser powers are
70
71
“incidental,” “subdivisions,” “minor ingredients which compose
72
73
[larger] objects,” and “powers . . . of inferior importance.” For
Marshall, creating a corporation could “pass as incidental to those
74
powers which are expressly given,” as several other powers could
75
not. In any event, McCulloch can be fairly cited for the proposition
that some powers are sufficiently important that they “cannot be

62. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
63. Id. at 407, 421.
64. Id. at 407.
65. Id. at 418.
66. Id. at 408.
67. Id. at 421; see id. (intimating that there is “reason to suppose that a constitution . . .
ought to have specified” some powers); id. at 422 (suggesting that constitutional drafters feel a
“motive for particularly mentioning” some powers).
68. Id. at 421.
69. Id. at 411.
70. Id. at 406.
71. Id. at 407.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 408.
74. Id. at 411.
75. Marshall provided several data points. See id. at 407 (characterizing as “great” the
powers “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies”); id. at 411 (classifying “the power[s]
of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce” as “great substantive and
independent power[s]”).
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implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing
76
them.”
If Marshall had advanced this dichotomy to invalidate a
congressional statute, as Chief Justice Roberts seems willing to do,
constitutional scholars would surely have committed his several
phrases to heart. But the logic of great powers hasn’t atrophied since
McCulloch, even if efforts to operationalize it are “strange-sounding
77
to modern ears.” Nearly two centuries later, Marshall’s distant
successor has championed the great-powers idea anew.
C. Great Powers in the Roberts Court
Chief Justice Roberts explicitly revived this “old, established line
78
of thinking” in his 2012 NFIB opinion. The ACA’s minimumcoverage provision was not warranted under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, he reasoned, because it bore the marks of a “great
79
substantive and independent power.” The individual mandate was
not a proper means of executing the Commerce power, because
requiring people to obtain adequate health insurance or pay a penalty
“vest[ed] Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the
80
necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.” It
would “work a substantial expansion of federal authority” for
Congress to “draw within its regulatory scope those [people] who
would otherwise be outside of it,” so that it could then regulate them
81
in a manner authorized by Article I, Section 8.
This is an odd way of revitalizing an elementary structural
principle—predicate-creation seems to have nothing to do with
comparative assessments of importance and inferiority, or with
82
abstract notions of greatness. Nor did Roberts assist readers by
76. Id. at 411; see also Baude, supra note 5, at 1753 (concluding that McCulloch endorsed
the idea that lesser powers are more properly left to implication). Not even Professor John
Manning, who opposes robust judicial enforcement of necessary-and-proper limitations, denies
that McCulloch created such a “test”; he claims only that it “was not central to McCulloch’s
analysis.” Manning, supra note 40, at 59 n.349.
77. Lawson & Kopel, supra note 47, at 270.
78. Baude, supra note 5, at 1749; see Burset, supra note 25, at 188 (observing that “the
notion of ‘great powers’ is well established”).
79. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (quoting
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411).
80. Id. at 2592.
81. Id.
82. Koppelman claims that “here [Roberts] is no longer relying on the ‘great substantive
and independent power’ idea.” Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 114. If
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“explain[ing] the provenance or implications of that statement.” But
he did claim that manufacturing the means for exercising an
84
enumerated power can never truly qualify as incidental. And the
mandate’s perceived greatness surely accounted for the “substantial
85
expansion of federal authority” he predicted. Congress had
attempted to aggrandize its authority relative to its proper
86
“regulatory scope” —that is, powers specifically enumerated and
implied powers that are not themselves “great substantive and
87
independent power[s].” If Roberts indeed adapted his great-powers
argument from Professor Gary Lawson and David Kopel’s
88
scholarship, he very likely understood the theoretical underpinnings
of Marshall’s great-powers phraseology, because those scholars
explicitly argued that a power to issue economic mandates was not
89
incidental to the related Commerce power and was too important to
90
be left to implication.
Roberts resorted to more orthodox great-powers reasoning in his
2013 Kebodeaux concurrence, propelling his intellectual stewardship
of the idea. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that Congress
could, under the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper
Clauses, require a former military serviceman to register as a sex
91
offender well after his release from federal custody. Roberts

Koppelman is right, it is unclear whether Roberts ever relies on great-powers principles in his
NFIB opinion. I doubt that Roberts would have emphasized predicate-creation had he not felt
compelled to distinguish NFIB from three recent power-sustaining Necessary and Proper
Clause decisions: United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600 (2004); and Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003). See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592
(summarizing and distinguishing these cases).
83. Baude, supra note 5, at 1749.
84. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2593 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)).
88. See Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 112 (“The distinction . . . is
drawn, without acknowledgment, from an attack on the mandate developed by Gary Lawson
and David Kopel.”); id. at 117 (“Roberts didn’t give the credit that Lawson and Kopel
deserved.”); Dorf, supra note 13, at 150 (“[T]his claim draws on an argument developed at some
length by Gary Lawson and David Kopel.”).
89. Lawson & Kopel, supra note 47, at 279–80 (“[T]he power to compel the purchase of a
product from another private party is not a ‘less worthy’ or less substantial power than the
power to regulate commerce . . . .”).
90. Id. at 280 (“It is an extraordinary power of independent significance, or ‘high[] dignity,’
that would be enumerated as a principal power if it were granted at all to the federal
government.” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421)).
91. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2505 (2013).
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concurred only in the Military Regulation Clause holding; he wrote
separately to clarify that the majority opinion should not be
92
interpreted as relying on a federal police power. For he could
imagine no clearer example of a “great substantive and independent
93
power” than what the majority seemed willing to countenance: an
ill-defined license to “help protect the public . . . and alleviate public
94
safety concerns.” When a power is of “that magnitude,” Roberts
“find[s] it implausible to suppose—and impossible to support—that
the Framers intended to confer such authority by implication rather
95
than expression.”
Because the majority’s military-regulation
rationale upheld a power “less substantial” than a pure federal police
power, the challenged registration requirement was “not such a ‘great
substantive and independent power’ that the Framers’ failure to
96
enumerate it must imply its absence.” Perhaps Baude’s elegant
article prompted Roberts to clarify his theoretical basis for quoting
97
McCulloch. In any event, the Chief Justice’s Kebodeaux concurrence
crisply depicts the notion of great powers, improving on NFIB’s more
enigmatic invocation.
None of Roberts’s colleagues joined these NFIB and Kebodeaux
passages, but his message has begun to resonate. Writing separately in
98
the highly anticipated 2014 case of Bond v. United States, Justice
Scalia argued that a congressional power to implement non-self99
executing treaties without observing structural constitutional
limitations would qualify as a “great substantive and independent
100
power.” With the right enabling treaty, such legislative discretion
101
would constitute a “general police power” and enable Congress to
102
abrogate the Court’s constitutional decisions. Although it would

92. Id. at 2507 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting id. at 2503 (majority opinion)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2508.
97. Baude clerked for Chief Justice Roberts, after all. John G. Roberts, Jr., OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
98. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
99. As the Supreme Court has explained, a non-self-executing treaty “does not by itself
give rise to domestically enforceable federal law” without “implementing legislation passed by
Congress.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008).
100. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2100.
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seem illogical for Article I to enumerate the power to allow the
103
“principle of limited federal powers to be set aside,” Scalia should
be considered as firmly within the great-powers camp, because he
favorably cited Baude’s seminal distillation of the idea of great
104
powers. As should Justice Thomas, who signed on to Scalia’s Bond
105
concurrence in full. Litigators have also taken the hint: Paul
Clement’s brief for Carol Anne Bond itself characterized an
unfettered congressional ability to effectuate non-self-executing
106
treaties as a prohibited great power.
Roberts’s renascent doctrine is hitting its jurisprudential stride.
107
Because three Justices have openly endorsed the idea, great-powers
limitations may soon begin to command majority holdings, and even
serve as the basis for striking down historic federal legislation. It is
108
largely unclear where this undertheorized principle might lead.
109
Newfound interest in the Necessary and Proper Clause portends
“important and potentially far-reaching consequences that have not
110
been fully appreciated—even by the Court itself.” Now is the

103. Id. at 2102. Scalia’s application is therefore conceptually problematic, because he
presumably means that an unreviewable power to implement non-self-executing treaties is too
important to be exercised through implication rather than enumeration.
104. Scalia specifically cited Baude’s seven-page synopsis of the great-powers concept, not
just his article generally. Id. at 2101. And it is fair to assume that the Justice who insisted that
Congress “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes,” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. 457, 468 (2001), believes that Article I does not, either.
105. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See Brief for Petitioner at 61, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12158) (“[T]he last place such plenary power lies inchoate . . . is the Necessary and Proper Clause.
An unchecked power to implement treaties would amount to exactly the sort of ‘great
substantive and independent power’ that the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot supply.”
(citations omitted)). Similarly, in a 2013 amicus brief disputing the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act, a group of federalism scholars argued that a congressional power to
define marital status is “exactly the type of power we would expect the Constitution to
enumerate.” Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 5, at 16.
107. Manning, supra note 40, at 59 (“Several members of the Roberts Court, though not the
Court itself, have now endorsed the ‘great powers’ approach as one metric for determining what
is ‘necessary and proper.’”).
108. See Baude, supra note 61, at 48 (“We just don’t know yet how much that inquiry will
yield, and what the answers will be. Much of the post-Founding discussion . . . will probably be
found in congressional and executive materials, not case law, and nobody has yet systematically
perused those materials with the relevant ‘revisionist’ lens.” (footnote omitted)).
109. See LaCroix, supra note 13, at 2060 (“In recent years . . . the Court has increasingly
brought the necessary and proper power to the center of federalism doctrine.”).
110. Id. at 2049; see id. at 2060 (“Because the power is relatively undertheorized, it provides
new avenues for doctrinal development, sometimes in surprising directions.”).
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time—not in the crucible of litigation—for scholars to survey the
great-powers concept’s sphere of operation.
II. TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION: A TEXTBOOK GREAT POWER
“It is worth asking,” of course, “whether and in what fashion the
111
Constitution permits the United States to expand its territory.”
Consistent application of the great-powers doctrine suggests a
shocking consequence: Texas and Hawaii were very likely acquired
unconstitutionally, their legislative annexations “merely acts of
112
usurpation.” Both land masses were annexed to the United States
113
through ordinary lawmaking in the form of a joint resolution. I start
with the assumption, required by the Tenth Amendment, that “every
exercise of [congressional] power must be traceable to an explicit or
114
implicit grant of power in the document.” There is no enumerated
territorial-annexation power in Article I, Section 8 or anywhere else
115
in the Constitution. Congress’s power to acquire foreign territory
must be inferred as incidental to a granted power, or it does not
116
exist.
Article IV, Section 3’s Admissions Clause provides that “[n]ew
117
States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” With

111. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 21 (2004); see John Gorham Palfrey, The
Growth of the Idea of Annexation, and Its Breaking upon Constitutional Law, 13 HARV. L. REV.
371, 394 (1899) (“Whether the [C]onstitution is violated or not is a serious question.”).
112. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (quoting
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997)).
113. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799, 835 (1995) (characterizing both annexation resolutions as “ordinary domestic legislation”).
For the joint resolutions themselves, see generally Joint Resolution for the Admission of the
State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1845), and Joint Resolution To
Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat.
750 (1898).
114. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 22; see Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257
(1967) (“[O]ur Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those
that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones.”). Article I, after all,
vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis
added).
115. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1845) (statement of Rep. Dromgoole); id.
app. at 84 (statement of Rep. Brengle); 31 CONG. REC. 6334 (1898) (statement of Sen. Foraker);
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 21.
116. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1845) (statement of Rep. Kennedy) (“If,
therefore, there was a power to acquire territory at all, conveyed in that instrument, all must
admit it to be a power of implication alone.”).
117. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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respect to Texas, this clause was the only textual “great outline” to
118
which an implied annexation power might have fairly answered. But
regardless of means–ends fit, acquiring sovereign territory is exactly
the kind of power that seems so important, so consequential, that it
would have been enumerated if Congress were meant to possess it.
And the relevant incident–principal relationship—using an implied
power (annexation) to create the necessary predicate for the exercise
of an enumerated power (admission of new states)—eerily resembles
119
the arrangement Roberts condemned in NFIB.
The typical constitutional defense of Congress’s annexation of
Texas goes something like this: Article IV empowers Congress to
admit new states to the Union. “It does not say precisely how this
must be accomplished. Congress chose to admit Texas as a new state,
120
by joint resolution. End of debate.” But several structural and
121
functionalist considerations, along with pre-1845 governmental
122
practice, suggest that Congress may admit new states only from
territory that existed when the Constitution was ratified or that might
be acquired through treaty. Moreover, the above defense highlights
Hawaii’s even shakier constitutional status, because sixty-one years
123
elapsed between its annexation and admission to the Union.
Regarding Hawaii, it is irrelevant for great-powers purposes whether
the language of the Admissions Clause actually authorizes Congress
to admit foreign territory directly to statehood, because Congress
118. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1845) (statement of Sen. Morehead)
(“[O]f all the articles in the [C]onstitution, and of all the enumerated powers of that instrument,
it is only upon the [Admissions Clause], that reliance is placed for the authority of Congress to
annex a foreign territory to this Union.”). As Ralph Brock has noted, when Congress annexed
Texas through joint resolution, it purported to “act[] under [its] power to admit new states.”
Ralph H. Brock, “The Republic of Texas Is No More”: An Answer to the Claim That Texas Was
Unconstitutionally Annexed to the United States, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 679, 728 (1997).
119. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
120. James W. Paulsen, If at First You Don’t Secede: Ten Reasons Why the “Republic of
Texas” Movement Is Wrong, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 803 (1997); see also LAWSON & SEIDMAN,
supra note 111, at 93 (“If Congress passed (and the President signed) ordinary legislation
authorizing the annexation of territory, that legislation would be fully effective as a matter of
domestic law. . . . [T]he legislation could be enacted pursuant to the Admissions Clause if the
territory was immediately entering statehood.”).
121. See infra Part II.A.2.
122. See infra notes 144–49, 198–206 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. Lawson and Seidman see no
constitutional problem here, either: they argue that Congress may acquire foreign territory
“pursuant to the [Necessary and Proper] Clause if [the acquired land] was to be held as a
territory for some time (or if, for some reason, acquisition must temporally precede
admission).” LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 93.
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chose not to confer statehood on Hawaii immediately. Hawaii thus
presents the perfect test case for territorial annexation as a “great
substantive and independent power.”
This jarring application of the great-powers concept is not
entirely original. Constitutional opponents of annexing Texas
125
repeatedly anticipated this Part’s exact argument, though no one
seems to have consciously invoked Marshall’s magic phrases. In both
1845 and 1898, congressmen assembled a strong textual and structural
case for the unconstitutionality of annexation through joint
resolution. Even if constitutional objections ultimately subserved
126
antislavery and anti-imperialist motives,
these congressmen
exhibited an impressive devotion to the limiting logic of a government
127
of enumerated powers. This Part explores their arguments against
the backdrop of the reinvigorated great-powers doctrine. Consistent
application of this doctrine should lead its proponents to conclude
that Texas and Hawaii were unconstitutionally annexed to the United
States.
In 1898, though, virtually all congressional opponents of
annexing Hawaii implicitly conceded that Texas withstood
constitutional rigor, because it had been annexed (and admitted)
128
pursuant to the literal words of the Admissions Clause. Hawaii
129
would not elect senators and congressmen immediately, so no

124. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
125. To my knowledge, this Note is the first effort to canvass Texas’s annexation through
the lens of great powers. So I disagree that Professor Earl Maltz’s excellent article provides a
“complete analysis of the constitutional aspects of the struggle over Texas.” Earl M. Maltz, The
Constitution and the Annexation of Texas, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 381, 381 (2006).
126. But see Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, The Louisiana
Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 18031898, at 83, 88 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow eds., 2005) (denying that “objections
to [Texas’s] annexation overtly based on opposition to the joint resolution and expansionism
were smokescreens for the objections based on opposition to slavery”).
127. Their exertions thus powerfully demonstrate how the great-powers concept “can be
useful in nonjudicial constitutional interpretation,” since “Congress and the President . . . are
supposed to decide whether the laws they pass and implement are constitutionally permissible.”
Baude, supra note 5, at 1810.
128. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d. Sess. 246 (1845) (statement of Sen. Walker)
(“[T]hat clause of the [C]onstitution, which authorizes Congress to admit new States into the
Union . . . was in express words, and no man has a right to interpolate restrictions.”); id. at 321
(statement of Sen. Merrick) (“‘New States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union.’
How plain! [H]ow explicit! [H]ow comprehensive! Language could not be plainer; and words
could not show more directly and more certainly our authority and power to pass the joint
resolution now on the table, than these words.”).
129. Hawaii did not become a state until 1959. See infra note 229.
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institutional precedent could squarely legitimate its annexation. But
by conceding Texas’s constitutionality to facilitate distinctiondrawing, opponents surrendered the even clearer great-powers
objection to acquiring foreign territory not immediately intended for
statehood. After all, the Constitution apparently permitted one
species of legislative annexation, and surely the power to acquire new
possessions and convert them to statehood included the power merely
to acquire those possessions. Accordingly, great-powers rhetoric
appeared nowhere in the congressional campaign to defeat Hawaii’s
130
annexation, where it could have operated even more forcefully than
in 1845.
The annexation of Hawaii therefore represents a regrettable
missed opportunity for a robust congressional debate about what
“great substantive and independent power[s]” are and how to reason
about them responsibly. But the terms on which this debate was
conducted nonetheless suggest a useful heuristic for identifying great
powers: if a power can be (or historically has been) justified only as
an incident of national sovereignty, it is an especially worthy
contender for great-power status.
Four objections are worth answering before examining the Texas
and Hawaii annexations in Parts II.A and II.B. First, “it is wrong to
view the admission of Texas as if it involved a congressional-executive
131
agreement,” and “[t]he same is true of Hawaii.” Congress acted
unilaterally in both cases; its “ordinary domestic legislation” did not
132
simply ratify executive agreements negotiated with foreign powers.
So I disagree with Vasan Kesavan and Professor Michael Stokes
Paulsen that Texas’s annexation represents “the first ‘congressional133
executive agreement’ in the history of the United States.”
Second, a congressional territorial-annexation power cannot be
inferred from the enumerated power “[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United

130. Congressmen debated the issue throughout June 1898. See 31 CONG. REC. 5770–6712
(1898) (analyzing the political and constitutional issues related to Hawaii’s annexation).
131. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 113, at 835.
132. Id.
133. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let’s Mess with Texas, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1587, 1593 (2004). Nor was either statutory annexation essentially a “treaty ratified by joint
resolution.” Eric Steven O’Malley, Note, Irreconcilable Rights and the Question of Hawaiian
Statehood, 89 GEO. L.J. 501, 512 (2001).
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134

States.” Article II empowers the president to “make Treaties” with
135
foreign governments, subject to Senate ratification.
But a
congressional power to annex foreign territory in no way effectuates
the president’s power to conclude treaties annexing foreign
territory—it supplants it. Annexing foreign territory no more
implements the power to annex foreign territory than granting letters
136
of marque effectuates the power to grant letters of marque.
Third, Professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove object that
the treaty process was ill-suited to acquire the Republics of Texas and
Hawaii. After all, “what would have been the point of a treaty with a
country that was immediately going out of existence when the
agreement was executed? . . . Any promises made in a treaty would
137
have immediately lost their international character.”
But
annexation clauses do not make promises—they transfer land.
Cession treaties need not stipulate any ongoing obligations between
sovereign nations. And regardless, the specter of international-law
anomalies cannot create congressional authority within a framework
138
of limited and enumerated powers. If the Constitution does not
authorize congressional acquisition of foreign territory, any oddity in
allowing entire countries to be acquired through treaty cannot rectify
statutory annexation’s constitutional defects.
Fourth, and similarly, Congress cannot bootstrap its way into
possessing a territorial-annexation power merely because the treaty
form seems poorly adapted to acquiring certain lands. Consider the
case of truly unoccupied territory, or of territory so sparsely inhabited

134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (empowering Congress to “grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal”).
137. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 113, at 835; see also LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note
111, at 109 (“A treaty could secure the consent of the foreign sovereign to annexation, but as
soon as the annexation is complete, the treaty no longer exists because one of the parties to the
treaty no longer exists.”).
138. As Lawson and Seidman themselves insist, “The United States government is defined
by the federal Constitution, not by the law of nations.” LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at
100; see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“If no
enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted
. . . .”); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (“Our Constitution governs us and we must
never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or
those that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones.”); Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 618 (1850) (“Our own Constitution and form of government must
be our only guide.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration [of
certain congressional powers] presupposes something not enumerated.”).
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as to enjoy no centralized control and therefore no obvious authority
139
to cede land. No negotiating counterparty would exist in such
situations. Yet the Supreme Court accounted for them in 1890, when
it recognized an organic mode of acquiring territorial sovereignty:
“dominion of new territory may be acquired by discovery and
occupation . . . of territory unoccupied by any other government or its
140
141
Whatever the merits of this position,
the more
citizens.”
fundamental point is that Congress may never legislate over an area
142
simply because denying it such power would be inconvenient.
A. Texas
143

Despite President Jefferson’s constitutional misgivings, the
144
United States annexed the Louisiana Territory by treaty in 1803. It
145
acquired Spanish Florida through the same means in 1819. By 1828,
Chief Justice Marshall could declare that the “government possesses
146
the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty.”
So when the Tyler administration set its sights on Texas, it was blackletter law that the United States could constitutionally acquire foreign

139. I thank Bill O’Connell for pressing this point.
140. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
141. Lawson and Seidman argue that Jones was “singularly unpersuasive” on this score
because it justified discovery-based acquisition through “general understandings about
governmental power drawn from the law of nations,” apparently without reference to domestic
constitutional limitations. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 100. Those same limitations
also undermine Lawson and Seidman’s defense of a congressional annexation power. See infra
notes 328–34 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. See EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812, at 23 (1920) (describing Jefferson’s perceived “need of a
constitutional amendment to authorize the acquisition” of foreign territory). Jefferson
presumably would have been doubly opposed to statutory annexation because of the additional
burden of justifying congressional power.
144. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr.
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
145. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and
His Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
146. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828). If territorial annexation is
indeed a great power, any assumed national power to acquire enemy territory through military
conquest should not be understood as a latent congressional power incidental to its enumerated
power to declare war. For if annexation is too important to be inferred, this holds true
regardless of which enumerated power it might effectuate. The propriety of acquiring territory
through military conquest is therefore governed not directly by domestic constitutional law, but
by jus in bello—the body of international law marking the limits of acceptable belligerent
behavior.
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territory through treaty. American and Texian diplomats signed
such a treaty in April 1844, but the Senate rejected it by the
149
overwhelming margin of 35–16.
Annexationists soon resorted to the more numerically permissive
device of ordinary lawmaking in the form of a joint resolution. This
proposal was unprecedented, since the United States had never
150
acquired foreign territory legislatively. As Chief Justice Roberts
later observed in NFIB, “sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a]
severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’
151
for Congress’s action.”
Opponents of annexation certainly
152
“pause[d] to consider the implications” of a never-before-asserted
congressional power. Congressman Samuel Sample, for one, labeled
this opportunistic circumvention of the customary treaty process “a
153
hop, skip, and jump over the [C]onstitution.” The Supreme Court’s

147. It appears that not a single congressman disputed this proposition during the debates
over annexing Texas. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1845) (statement of
Rep. Dromgoole) (“[H]e did not question the power of this government to be exercised by the
President, in the form of a treaty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to acquire
territory.”); id. at 187 (statement of Rep. Barnard) (“[H]e admitted—and this was the important
point in his admissions—that the government may acquire foreign territory by treaty.”); see also
Palfrey, supra note 111, at 386 (“[S]carcely a word was said [in 1845] against acquisition of
territory by the treaty-making power . . . .”). The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged
(though never held) that the United States may annex foreign territory through treaty. See
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 673 (1945) (“It is no longer doubted that the
United States may acquire territory by . . . treaty . . . .”); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 32 (1907)
(“It is too late in the history of the United States to question the right of acquiring territory by
treaty.”).
148. Citizens of the Republic of Texas referred to themselves as “Texians,” not “Texans.”
Dorman H. Winfrey, Mirabeau H. Lamar and Texas Nationalism, 59 S.W. HIST. QUART. 184,
188 (1955).
149. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 652 (1844); LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111,
at 92.
150. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1845) (statement of Rep. Sample)
(“[T]his question was a new one, so far as regarded the power of the House to act on the
subject.”); id. app. at 84 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle) (“It was now, for the first time, after
the lapse of almost three score years and ten, that we were called to exercise a power hitherto
latent, and which had remained undiscovered, or at least unused, all that time.”); id. app. at 215
(statement of Rep. Seymour) (“There is not, sir, a solitary case to be found in the whole history
of our legislation . . . for a period of more than half a century, in which foreign territory has been
acquired by the action of the legislative power alone.”); id. app. at 411 (statement of Rep.
Rayner) (characterizing legislative annexation as entirely “unsanctioned by national usage”).
151. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (quoting
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010)).
152. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
153. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 72 (1845) (statement of Rep. Sample).
Others were less diplomatic: “[I]t was a new and monstrous heresy on the [C]onstitution, got up
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treatment of historical practice suggests a wisdom to Sample’s
154
skepticism.
Part II.A.1 tracks individual congressmen’s assertions that the
power to annex foreign territory is too important to have been left to
implication. Part II.A.2 rounds out the great-powers objection to
annexing Texas by providing textual and structural support for a
reading of the Admissions Clause that forbids Congress to admit
foreign territory directly to statehood.
1. The Great-Powers Objection.
Echoing McCulloch, and
prefiguring NFIB and Kebodeaux, opponents of acquiring Texas
converged on a basic objection: annexation of foreign territory was
too important a constitutional power to have been left to implication.
Senator William Archer observed that congressional “powers of
principal order” were enumerated “in one place, and with each
155
other.” Acquiring foreign land was a fateful undertaking—it could
156
“change the whole character of the government.” Could it be
believed that “if a power far larger than any of these principal
powers . . . was intended to be given,” the Framers would have failed
157
to mention it? How could annexationists account for “this great
158
power[’s]” omission from the schedule of enumeration?
Annexation-through-implication could not be squared with the act’s
“extraordinary importance,” or with the painstaking scheme of
159
legislative empowerment. Others esteemed annexation a “very
160
important and high power,” a “distinct, substantive, independent
161
162
“peculiarly important,”
“so vast and responsible a
power,”
. . . for the mere purpose of carrying a measure by a bare majority of Congress, that could not be
carried by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.” Id. at 304 (statement of Sen. Choate).
154. Very recently, the Court “put significant weight upon historical practice” in interpreting
the Recess Appointments Clause. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2559 (2014) (emphasis in original). Regardless of the subject matter, the “Court has treated
[historical] practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that
practice is subject to dispute.” Id. at 2560 (collecting several cases).
155. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 328 (1845) (statement of Sen. Archer).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. app. at 85 (statement of Rep. Brengle).
161. Id. at 188 (statement of Rep. Barnard). Chief Justice Marshall used each of these
descriptors in McCulloch. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)
(labeling as “great substantive and independent” those powers that cannot be implied as
incidental to an enumerated power); id. at 421–22 (claiming that “distinct and independent”
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power,” and a “proposition so important.” Annexation was the
“the main question” to which associated enumerations seemed
165
“incidental” by comparison.
Proponents of annexation pointed to the Admissions Clause of
Article IV, Section 3, which provides that “[n]ew States may be
166
admitted by the Congress into this Union.” Were these not the
167
“plainest and broadest words known to the English language”? The
Constitution’s text interposed “nothing to limit the constitutional
168
power of Congress” to admit new states. For Congressman James
Pollock, though, such offhand literalism elided a crucial structural
inquiry. If the power to admit implies the power to acquire in order to
admit, “the incident is superior to the principal; the implied power
169
more important than the power granted.” Although in most
instances “the major proposition may and does include the
minor . . . here the minor is made to include the major, which is an
170
absurdity.”
Likewise, Congressman Kenneth Rayner warned that failing to
police the concept of incidentality “would convert this government
171
into one of unlimited and undefinable power.” Annexationists had

powers cannot be exercised without a “place among the enumerated powers of [Congress]”). It
seems extremely unlikely that someone would have independently composed this precise
configuration of words, but I also doubt that a Whig congressman would have consciously
declined to invoke Marshall’s authority on this divisive constitutional issue. The Globe gives no
indication that Barnard drew his words or ideas from McCulloch.
162. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 339 (1845) (statement of Rep. Garrett
Davis).
163. Id. at 125 (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
164. Id. at 191 (statement of Rep. McIlvaine).
165. Id. at 121 (statement of Rep. Sample). This Note does not consider whether
annexation is somehow more or less important than the associated power to admit new states.
166. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; see Kmiec, supra note 27, at 19 (“Congress’ power to
admit new states, it was argued, was the basis of constitutional power to [e]ffect the
annexation.”).
167. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1845) (statement of Rep. Dean); see also id.
at 281 (statement of Rep. Morehead) (characterizing the argument as follows: “The
[C]onstitution said that Congress might admit new States into the Union; Texas was [to be] a
new State; ergo, Congress might admit Texas into the Union.”).
168. Id. at 122 (statement of Rep. Dean).
169. Id. app. at 359 (statement of Rep. Pollock).
170. Id.
171. Id. app. at 411 (statement of Rep. Rayner). Almost 170 years later, Chief Justice
Roberts concluded that characterizing the ACA’s minimum-coverage provision as “incidental”
to the Commerce power “would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.” Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
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forgotten that “implied power[s] must be proper, as well as
172
necessary.” Rayner thus shoehorned his structural intuition into the
Necessary and Proper Clause’s text, as Chief Justice Roberts would
173
later do. Rayner analogized annexation for the sake of admission to
the seizure of private bullion in order to coin money, or the
174
impressment of sailors in order to provide and maintain a navy. All
three “absurdities” would warp the constitutional structure through a
175
licentious reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also exposed the joint
resolution’s perceived constitutional deficiencies in a scathing report
denouncing the proposed annexation of Texas. The Committee, too,
argued that territorial annexation was too important a legislative
topic to be discovered through the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Incidental powers must be “fair, not forced, accidents” of their
176
enumerated parents.
The Constitution nowhere mentioned a
congressional annexation power, “as might have been expected,
177
supposing it contemplated.” Annexationists derived this power
178
from “a single line in the Constitution”: the Admissions Clause.
“How brief the phrase, how pregnant the import, if the widest of the
179
interpretations claimed for it is to be adopted!” As the Committee
contended, that clause—“so circumscribed in words, and inserted . . .
in no important connection in the Constitution”—could not
180
accommodate the claimed power’s “indefiniteness and magnitude.”
So the Committee specifically asserted that annexation was too great
to be accomplished through implication, and it more broadly
suggested that a vast and important power should not be inferred
from an enumerated relative if the granted power was apparently not

172. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 411 (1845) (statement of Rep. Rayner).
173. Roberts explained that “[e]ven if the individual mandate is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s
insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means for making those
reforms effective.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592.
174. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 411 (1845) (statement of Rep. Rayner).
175. Id.
176. S. REP. NO. 28-79 (1845) [hereinafter TEXAS REPORT], in 6 COMPILATION OF
REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789-1901, FIRST
CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, TO FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 78, 81 (1901)
[hereinafter REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS].
177. Id. at 83.
178. Id. at 92.
179. Id. In other words, the Constitution “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
180. TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, at 92.
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significant enough to warrant inclusion in Article I, Section 8’s
181
fraternity of “great outlines.”
Congressman Francis Brengle emphasized annexation’s
importance by examining the rest of Article IV, Section 3. Under that
section’s Property Clause, Congress may also “dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
182
Property belonging to the United States.” If the power to dispose of
territory was “a matter of so much interest” as to induce its
enumeration, why was the power to acquire territory—so “high and
important an act”—not also mentioned if Congress was supposed to
183
possess it? As Brengle remarked, “Here was the proper place to
insert it, and yet not a word was said about it. Surely the one power
184
was as important as the other.”
For what it might be worth, constitutional critics of annexing
Texas also anticipated the peculiar variant of great-powers thinking
that Chief Justice Roberts introduced in NFIB: that Congress may
not create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated
power, thereby drawing within its regulatory ambit something
185
properly outside of it. If an annexation power followed from the
power to admit new states, Congressman Daniel Barnard reasoned,
“the incident precedes, and actually creates, the principal power.
There is no subject-matter for the principal power to operate upon,
186
till the incident has acted.” Surely this was “a new discovery in the
187
way of incidental powers.” On the same principle, Congress could
acquire foreign territory in order to establish post roads or conduct a
188
census there. But Article IV, Section 3’s cognate clauses conferred

181. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Senator Willie Mangum
similarly noted the “peculiar position which [the Admissions Clause] occupied in that
instrument. . . . It was not placed in juxtaposition to the enumerated powers of Congress, but
was found in the third section of the fourth article, separate from the enumerated powers of
Congress.” CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1845) (statement of Sen. Mangum).
182. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
183. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 85 (statement of Rep. Brengle).
184. Id.
185. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
186. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 350 (1845) (statement of Rep. Barnard);
see also id. (“[T]he Texian territory must be brought into the United States, and under its
jurisdiction, before the power to admit a State into the Union out of it can begin to operate.”).
187. Id.
188. See id. (offering a slightly different example—annexation of foreign territory in order
to regulate commerce between such land and the United States “on the footing of commerce
between the States”).
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no “power of acquisition, or authority of primary character.” Both
clauses spoke instead to the “auxiliary power of arrangement and
regulation of subjects already, or by some other warrant to be
190
brought within the jurisdiction of the government.” In other words,
the enumerated power to regulate territory and property did not
“confe[r] as an incident upon Congress the power to acquire territory
191
and property to furnish something to govern and to regulate.”
2. Structural and Functionalist Arguments Against Admissions
Clause Literalism. The argument that Texas’s annexation was too
important to be left to implication depends, of course, on the
assumption that the Admissions Clause did not itself authorize
foreign acquisitions. (If it did, the power would be enumerated, not
implied.) The Clause itself seems capacious enough: “New States may
192
be admitted by the Congress.” But admitted from what territory?
This Subsection does not exhaustively survey the Framing
generation’s subjective hopes and expectations (if any) about how the
Clause would apply, nor does it reconstruct the putative semantic
193
content of “new” and “state” at the time of ratification. It instead
summarizes anti-annexationists’ powerful rejoinder to Admissions
Clause literalism: that Congress may admit new states only from the

189. Id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
193. Immediately after Hawaii’s annexation, one public-minded lawyer offered a restrictive
originalist take on congressional power under the Admissions Clause. See James W. Stillman, A
New Method of Acquiring Territory, 10 GREEN BAG 373, 375 (1898) (“[T]he provision of the
Constitution authorizing Congress to admit new States was intended by its authors to apply only
to such States as might be formed out of territory already belonging to the United States and
out of such other territory as it might afterwards acquire by the treaty-making power and by
conquest.”). But perhaps because the Articles of Confederation explicitly authorized Canada’s
admission to the old Confederation, an informed citizen might have understood the
Constitution’s Admissions Clause to permit foreign annexations, too. See ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI (“Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in the
measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this
Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to
by nine States.”). Then again, Article XI explicitly authorized foreign annexations; the
Admissions Clause did not. This shift may have been a deliberate effort to disallow legislative
annexation. Or perhaps the Framers intentionally sidestepped the issue in order to preserve a
precarious coalition, allowing later generations to fix the Admissions Clause’s geographic scope
through resort to structural and functionalist arguments that experience might illuminate.
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territories in existence when the Constitution was ratified or from
194
land later acquired through treaty.
Especially because the rest of Article IV speaks only to domestic
195
concerns,
the great-powers concept should inform our
interpretation of the Admissions Clause’s surface ambiguity; that is,
we should resolve any semantic doubt against an enumerated power’s
directly encompassing legislative objects that seem too important not
196
to have been unequivocally authorized. Congressmen marshaled the
following six arguments to discredit an interpretation of the
Admissions Clause that would allow Congress to admit foreign
territory directly to statehood. The stronger their arguments, the
more purely great-powers principles apply to the annexation of
197
Texas.
First, history had demonstrated that the treaty power was the
198
sole governmental means of acquiring foreign territory. Annexation
199
through treaty had been “sanctioned by a number of precedents” —

194. Or, technically, from land acquired through discovery or military conquest. For several
congressional assertions of the Admissions Clause’s limited geographic domain, with varying
levels of historical substantiation, see CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1845) (statement
of Rep. Sample); id. at 188 (statement of Rep. Barnard); id. at 190 (statement of Rep.
Stephens); id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Morehead); id. at 292 (statement of Sen. Rives); id. at
321 (statement of Sen. Simmons); id. at 391 (statement of Sen. Barrow).
195. The Admissions Clause is “immediately followed by two distinct provisions which limit
the exercise of the power, and which, by their very terms, are confined to the United States.” Id.
app. at 385 (statement of Sen. Berrien). Why would “the grant of the power relate to one
subject and the limitation to another; the power to foreign, the limitation to domestic States?”
Id. It is much more likely that “the same subject was in the minds of the framers of the
[C]onstitution, in granting the power, as in prescribing its limitation.” Id.
196. Perhaps great-powers concerns are themselves responsible for this perception of
textual ambiguity. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the
Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (explaining how extratextual
considerations such as structural inferences, customary practice, and anticipated consequences
can shape constitutional interpreters’ initial perceptions of textual clarity).
197. In any event, this Admissions Clause defense applies only to foreign territory annexed
and admitted to statehood simultaneously. No enumerated power directly authorized Hawaii’s
statutory annexation to the lesser status of a federal territory. See infra note 276 and
accompanying text.
198. For several endorsements of the exclusivity of treaty-based annexation, see CONG.
GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1845) (statement of Rep. Caleb Smith); id. at 121 (statement
of Rep. John Davis); id. at 137 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis); id. at 190 (statement of Rep.
Adams); id. at 279 (statement of Sen. Morehead); id. at 292 (statement of Sen. Rives); id. at 321
(statement of Sen. Simmons); id. app. at 71 (statement of Rep. Sample); id. app. at 216
(statement of Rep. Seymour); id. app. at 359 (statement of Rep. Barnard); id. app. at 410
(statement of Rep. Rayner).
199. Id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Morehead).
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Louisiana, Florida, and the earlier-attempted Texas agreement.
This unbroken progression demonstrated the treaty power’s
203
exclusivity as “the only legitimate construction of the constitution.”
204
Treating for foreign territory had become “our settled policy,” the
proper course “from the first organization of the government to the
205
present time.” The federal government had likely resorted to the
treaty process out of a sense of constitutional obligation, given that
“there had been frequent occasion for using [the congressional
206
annexation power], had its existence been known.” Why did
annexationists let themselves suffer such an excruciating
embarrassment—the Texas treaty’s failure—if there had been a much
simpler procedural alternative consistent with the Constitution?
Second, because no one doubted that the United States could
validly acquire foreign territory through treaty, annexationists would
bizarrely locate the same constitutional power in multiple sets of
federal actors. An expansive reading of the Admissions Clause would
thus “destroy the marks and the lines of division” in the
207
Constitution.
The Framers could not have countenanced an
institutional race to the negotiating table, granting a concurrent
annexation authority “to be exercised by the first which might seize
208
upon its subject.”

200. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr.
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
201. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and
His Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
202. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 652 (1844) (documenting the Senate’s
rejection of an annexation treaty with the Republic of Texas).
203. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1845) (statement of Sen. Morehead).
204. Id. app. at 72 (statement of Rep. Sample).
205. Id. app. at 215 (statement of Rep. Seymour); see also TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176,
at 81 (“The foreign territory which the nation has acquired having come through the avenue of
the treaty-making power of the Government, the opinion until very recently has prevailed
universally that this was the sole avenue through which it could be derived.”).
206. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 84 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle); see
also id. (“When this measure of annexation was first proposed, who thought of resorting to the
legislation of Congress to effect it? No resort was thought of but to the treaty-making power.”).
But perhaps a starting sample of three treaties and no joint resolutions was insufficient to
“liquidate[] and ascertai[n]” any original constitutional uncertainty regarding annexation. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 183 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
Regardless, the annexation saga demonstrates that Professor Baude’s desire to tether judges to
concrete historical practices cannot avoid irreducibly subjective line-drawing problems.
207. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 85 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle).
208. Id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis); see also Helvidius No. II, reprinted in
1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 621, 625–26 (J.B. Lippincott & Co.,
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Third, and relatedly, if Congress may acquire foreign territory, it
may also exercise any powers necessary and proper to effectuate its
annexation power. Such powers would logically include the
appointment of ambassadors and foreign ministers, which Article II
209
explicitly assigns to the president. A founding generation acutely
210
concerned with achieving international recognition would surely not
have tolerated multiple, perhaps dueling, ensembles of American
211
diplomatic representatives.
Fourth, a congressional annexation power would allow fleeting
majorities to transform the “character and the destiny of the
212
Republic.” A legislature permitted to acquire Texas could also
213
“receive England, Ireland, Holland, and the world.” A “fanatical
majority” intoxicated with “temporary ascendancy” might annex
214
Cuba, Haiti, Liberia, or China directly to statehood. Worse still,
such momentous judgments would be entirely immune from
reflection and reversal, because states simply do not deprive
215
themselves of their equal suffrage in the Senate. If slightly more
than one-third of the states may defeat alliances with foreign powers,
how could annexationists plausibly maintain that a bare majority of
senators—partnered with the right minority of state delegations in the
House—may consummate an essentially unamendable political
216
alliance?
1867) (“A concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the same function
with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in practice as it is unnatural in theory. . . .
[A]ll the powers of government, of which a partition is so carefully made among the several
branches, would be thrown into absolute hotchpot, and exposed to a general scramble.”).
209. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 85 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle).
210. See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010) (interpreting American constitution-making as an effort to achieve
full recognition from the European-based community of sovereign states).
211. Three decades earlier, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report maintained that
“[t]he nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . requires caution and unity of design.” REP.
OF SEN. BIBB (1816), in 6 REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 176,
at 21.
212. TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, at 92.
213. Id.
214. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1845) (statement of Sen. Morehead).
215. See U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.”). As the Court noted in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866), the
annexation of Texas “made important and permanent changes in the relative importance of
States and sections.” Id. at 500; see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1869)
(claiming that Texas “entered into an indissoluble relation” in 1845).
216. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1845) (statement of Rep. Winthrop).
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The smaller States never would have yielded their consent to having
such a power placed any where but where the States stood on an
equal footing, had all the same voice, and all the same weight. . . .
[No other power] touched so nearly State interests and State
sovereignty as the power of acquiring territory and dividing it up
into States. Had the idea ever entered their minds that Congress was
to have the power of admitting foreign States, the small States would
217
have withdrawn from the convention at once.

Fifth and sixth, anti-annexationists noted two final oddities
entailed by an “incidental” acquisition power. The United States
would thereby purport to bind foreign governments through ordinary
municipal laws. In this sense, Congressman Rayner argued, federal
statutes were “inoperative and void” beyond the Republic’s
218
borders. And annexationists defended the present joint resolution
219
on the grounds that Texas would literally become a “New State[]”
upon annexation; Congress presumably could not acquire foreign
220
But
territory without immediately admitting it to statehood.
annexing territory and admitting it to statehood “would necessarily
comprehend the entire substance of [mere annexation], and at the
221
same time be of a much higher and more comprehensive character.”
To suppose that Congress may “accomplish the major, with an
admission of its incompetency as to the minor included object . . .
222
leaves no further room for sophistry.”
*
*
*

217. Id. app. at 392 (statement of Sen. Barrow); see also Graber, supra note 126, at 89
(endorsing the argument that “a framing generation concerned with preserving a sectional
balance of power was unlikely to have sanctioned mere majorities to determine the course of
American expansion”).
218. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 411 (1845) (statement of Rep. Rayner).
For similar formulations of this objection, see id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Morehead), id. app.
at 72 (statement of Rep. Sample), id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis), and id. app.
at 350 (statement of Rep. Barnard); cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)
(rejecting the extraterritorial application of federal constitutional rights to nonresident aliens).
219. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
220. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis)
(“[S]ome gentlemen involve themselves in a solecism. They concede that Congress has not the
power to annex Texas as a territory, but may admit her as a State.”).
221. Id.
222. TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, at 99. The annexationists of 1898 conveniently
disregarded any earlier stipulations of “incompetency as to the minor included object.” See infra
Part II.B.2.
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President Polk signed the joint resolution annexing and
223
admitting Texas on December 29, 1845. But this act remained an
anomaly in the history of American territorial expansion. Although
the United States enlarged its borders on three separate occasions
over the next quarter century, it acquired each of these possessions
224
through the more mathematically cumbersome treaty process. In
fact, the Supreme Court overlooked (or ignored) the Texas departure
in 1890, when it declared that “[t]he power to acquire territory . . . is
derived from the treaty-making power and the power to declare and
225
carry on war.”
B. Hawaii
Strikingly, American efforts to acquire Hawaii mirrored the twostep process undertaken in 1845. The McKinley administration first
negotiated an annexation treaty in 1897, but the Senate failed to ratify
226
it. Only then did annexationists propose a joint resolution to annex
227
the Hawaiian islands, which would require mere majority approval
by both houses.

223. Joint Resolution for the Admission of the State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th
Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1845); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 133, at 1597.
224. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico
(Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo), U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 912; Treaty with Mexico
(Gadsden Purchase), U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031; Treaty Concerning the Cession of
the Russian Possessions in North America (Alaska-Purchase Treaty), U.S.-Russ., June 20, 1867,
15 Stat. 539.
225. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 42 (1890); see Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 507 (1871) (“The war power and the treatymaking power, each carries with it authority to acquire territory. Louisiana, Florida, and Alaska
were acquired under the latter, and California under both.”). Only in 1901 did the Court
explicitly assume the constitutionality of statutory annexation. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
1, 196 (1901) (“The territory thus acquired [by treaty or conquest] is acquired as absolutely as if
the annexation were made, as in the case of Texas and Hawaii, by an act of Congress.”). This
ipse dixit was a “complete reversal” of the Court’s earlier pronouncements. Brock, supra note
118, at 733 n.252. Professor Mark Graber downplays the importance of this “single sentence in
an opinion concerned with other issues,” because neither party’s attorney had addressed the
constitutionality of annexation through joint resolution. Graber, supra note 126, at 90. “Such
unsupported dictum is not normally considered sufficient to establish any proposition of
constitutional law. . . . Whether the United States may annex a foreign country by joint
resolution has never been the subject of debate before the justices. That issue, under
conventional understandings of legal precedent, remains undecided.” Id.
226. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 108.
227. See JOHN W. FOSTER, II DIPLOMATIC MEMOIRS 174 (1909) (“Owing to the opposition
of many of the Democratic Senators to the Hawaiian Treaty and the facility of obstruction and
delay in that body, it was decided to attempt to bring about the annexation by joint resolution,
following the precedent of the annexation of Texas.”).
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Congress has acquired foreign territory without admitting it
directly to statehood just once—on July 7, 1898, when President
228
McKinley signed the joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian islands.
Hawaii’s annexation presents an ideal fact pattern for consideration
of the great-powers theory, since it requires no disputable
assumptions about the Admissions Clause’s meaning (that is, whether
Congress may admit foreign territory directly to statehood). The
power to acquire territory would undoubtedly enable Congress to
exercise its Admissions power. After all, Congress admitted the
229
earlier-acquired Territory of Hawaii to statehood in 1959. But if
territorial annexation is a great power, Congress may not infer an
annexation power in order to facilitate the exercise of its Admissions
power, however convenient or useful available territory might be for
that purpose.
In 1845, opponents of annexation argued that territorial
acquisition is precisely the kind of power that must be conferred
230
expressly, if at all. Their objections apply perforce to Hawaii, since
231
no clause directly authorized the joint resolution annexing Hawaii.
But in 1898, none of the critics’ constitutional grievances sounded in
232
233
the logic of “vast powers”
and “great objects.”
Instead,
congressmen quarreled over whether they even needed to ground
legislative action in the Constitution’s text, and whether historical
practice validated or precluded congressional acquisition of territory
234
not immediately admitted to statehood.
I suspect that most congressmen who opposed the 1898 joint
resolution on constitutional grounds would have gladly characterized
228. Joint Resolution To Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States,
J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 Stat. 750 (July 7, 1898); H. WAYNE MORGAN, WILLIAM
MCKINLEY AND HIS AMERICA 225 (rev. ed. 2003).
229. More precisely, Congress delegated the Admissions power to the president. See Act of
Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (prescribing terms for Hawaii’s admission to the
Union as a state); Proclamation No. 3309, 24 Fed. Reg. 6868 (1959) (admitting Hawaii as a
state).
230. See supra Part II.A.1.
231. But see infra note 252 and accompanying text (describing three annexationists’
contention that Congress may annex foreign territory under a strikingly capacious reading of
the General Welfare Clause).
232. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819).
233. Id. at 418. Senator William Lindsay did describe annexation as “the very highest
conceivable legislative power,” but not in the course of arguing that it was too important to be
employed as incidental to a granted power. 31 CONG. REC. 6671 (1898) (statement of Sen.
Lindsay).
234. See infra Part II.B.1–.2.
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annexation as a great power and denied, as a theoretical matter, that
the Admissions Clause empowers Congress to acquire foreign
territory and admit it to statehood immediately. But virtually no one
235
dared to relitigate Texas during the debates over annexing Hawaii.
Far easier to argue that only the treaty power can acquire foreign
territory, save the constitutionally special (and obviously
distinguishable) situation of foreign land being admitted directly to
statehood.
Merely denying Texas’s precedential relevance would not have
precluded anyone from labeling annexation a great power, of course.
And perhaps no one as much as pondered the concept in 1898 or
considered its application to Hawaii. But because annexationists
relied so crucially—perhaps entirely—on historical precedents, critics
apparently made a calculated political choice simply to concede
Texas’s constitutionality and focus their energies on contrasting the
relevantly dissimilar facts of 1845 and 1898.
Part II.B.1 examines dueling congressional claims regarding the
need to anchor any congressional annexation power in the
constitutional text. If the power were inherent, after all, it would be
236
exempt from great-powers strictures.
Part II.B.2 questions
annexationists’ reliance on Texas as a precedent for acquiring foreign
land without simultaneously admitting it to statehood. It then
criticizes their argument that if Congress may admit foreign land
directly to statehood, surely it may annex such land to the lesser
constitutional status of a federal territory. Part II.B.2 concludes by
observing that congressional powers historically defended as essential
to nationhood are especially likely to be classifiable as great powers.
1. “Powers Inherent in Sovereignty” Versus the Need for a Textual
Hook. At least in 1845, annexationists attempted to derive a
congressional territorial-expansion power from the Constitution’s
text. Most advocates of annexing Hawaii simply discarded this quaint
235. Senator Donelson Caffery seems to have been the sole exception. See 31 CONG. REC.
6405 (1898) (statement of Sen. Caffery) (arguing that Texas furnished “nothing more nor less
than the precedent that a certain political majority in Congress, having political purposes in
view, voted as for a partisan necessity to take Texas into the Union”); id. at 6480–81 (statement
of Sen. Caffery) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States was violated in the admission of
Texas under a joint resolution. . . . She got in by a violation, in my opinion, of the
Constitution.”).
236. If nationhood itself created legislative authority, the relative greatness of such a power
would be immaterial. And there would be no need to justify an inherent power as incidental to
an enumerated one—it would simply exist.
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approach. Because “the right to extend its territory is inherent in any
nation,” one congressman argued, “it requires no special provision of
237
the Constitution to enable us to annex additional territory.” There
was nothing wrong with venturing outside the Constitution, because
the “power to annex is a necessary consequence of our existence as a
238
sovereign and independent nation.” Only a “positive constitutional
239
prohibition,” absent here, could have altered this universal baseline.
But however seductive the notion that some arm of the U.S.
government must be able to extend America’s national borders, the
Tenth Amendment confirms that “delegation alone warrants the
240
exercise of any [congressional] power.” Even if one grants that the
federal government must possess a certain power, it does not at all
241
follow that Congress may wield that power. The Tenth Amendment
functions as a “positive constitutional prohibition” on congressional
annexation of foreign territory absent express or incidental
empowerment, because extraconstitutional national powers are “not
242
delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”
Constitutional critics of annexing Hawaii vehemently denounced
the notion of powers inherent in sovereignty. Their unheeded civics
lesson evinced an admirable dedication to the project of written

237. Id. at 5839 (statement of Rep. Henry).
238. Id. at 5919 (statement of Rep. Bromwell); see also id. at 5914 (statement of Rep.
Danford) (“[T]he right to acquire additional territory by the Government of the United States
was one of the inherent rights that belong to sovereign countries.”); id. at 6156 (statement of
Sen. Teller) (“[T]he United States may add territory to territory without any constitutional
provision whatever.”); id. at 6334 (statement of Sen. Foraker) (“What does the Constitution of
the United States say about the annexation of territory? Not one word. . . . I contend that it is
inherent.”); id. at 6347 (statement of Sen. White) (arguing that Congress may annex territory
“because this is a nation”); id. at 6369 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“It is sovereign power. It is
not written in the Constitution.”); id. at 6572 (statement of Sen. Pettus) (characterizing
territorial annexation as “one of the attributes of government”).
239. Id. at 5919 (statement of Rep. Bromwell).
240. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 620 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James Madison
to the Virginia Ratifying Convention). Madison presumably understood implication to be
included within delegation.
241. See Stillman, supra note 193, at 375 (“The writer does not deny the power of the
Federal Government to acquire territory; but he insists that if that is to be done at all, it must be
done in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution; and unless it can be shown that this
power has been therein conferred upon Congress either by express grant or by necessary
implication, it does not exist.”).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. X. For an incisive judicial critique of the notion of powers
inherent in sovereignty, see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer,
J., dissenting).
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constitutionalism, and specifically to the idea of a federal legislature
243
with limited regulatory competencies. “The preservation of the
constitutional limitations and guarant[ees] is of infinitely greater
importance” than gratifying today’s ephemeral desires, one
244
congressman assured his colleagues. Legislative proposals must
245
always “ru[n] the ga[u]ntlet of every constitutional safeguard.”
Accordingly, congressmen should internalize the maxim that “[i]f it is
not written in the Constitution or is not implied to carry out some
246
written power, then it does not exist.” The issue was not whether
the national government ought to be able to acquire foreign territory,
but where, within this constitutional system, such a power might
247
reside. For annexationists’ inherent-powers argument to work, they
248
needed to “establish that sovereignty resides in Congress.”
Especially because no tribunal would dare to invalidate an
249
enlargement of America’s national borders, “the consciences of
Senators ought to be quick and alive to the necessity of observing the
250
constitutional limitations in this regard.” Territorial annexation was

243. Fortunately, the notion of inherent congressional powers has “recently come under
strong criticism. That skepticism should be extended to” annexation. Baude, supra note 5, at
1743.
244. 31 CONG. REC. 5920 (1898) (statement of Rep. Crumpacker); see id. at 6148 (statement
of Sen. Bacon) (imploring his colleagues “to consider the question whether or not they have the
right, under their constitutional obligations, to vote for this resolution, however much they may
favor the annexation of Hawaii,” because “[n]o senator ought to desire its annexation
sufficiently to induce him to give his support to an unconstitutional measure”).
245. Id. at 5976 (statement of Rep. Ball).
246. Id. at 6369 (statement of Sen. Allen); see also id. at 6635 (statement of Sen. Allen)
(“[P]owers not expressly granted or not necessarily implied or proper for the execution of
granted powers do not exist and can not be constitutionally employed.”); id. at 6671 (statement
of Sen. Lindsay) (“Is there any other legislative power vested in the Congress? If so, by whom,
and when and where was the grant made?”).
247. Id. at 6332 (statement of Sen. Turley); see also id. at 6578 (statement of Sen. Mallory)
(“We do not deny that the United States Government has the power . . . to annex territory. . . .
[B]ut that right must be exercised in a particular way and through a particular branch of the
Government of the United States.”); id. at 6667 (statement of Sen. Lindsay) (“Powerful as this
Government may be . . . it has no power independent of the Constitution—no power selfexistent, to be exercised independently of a constitutional grant, express or implied.”).
248. Id. at 6370 (statement of Sen. Caffery). After all, “Why not the executive, why not the
judicial, if you please, as well as Congress, if this power can be exercised indiscriminately
without any regard to the Constitution”? Id.
249. See Palfrey, supra note 111, at 398 (“[I]f the [annexation] question should come up in
the courts to-day . . . they would undoubtedly hold the legislation valid.”).
250. 31 CONG. REC. 6366 (1898) (statement of Sen. Caffery).
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therefore a “dangerous step, and one that can hardly, if ever, be
251
retraced.”
To the extent that annexationists in 1898 sought to trace the
power to any piece of constitutional text, they gestured to the
General Welfare Clause. This provision supposedly licensed Congress
to act in any way conducive to the national interest, assuming the
252
chosen action wasn’t expressly prohibited.
But instead of
articulating a textually grounded case for congressional
empowerment, most annexationists simply declared the issue settled
by historical practice.
2. Characterizing Historical Practice. When the United States
acquired territory before 1898, it almost always did so through
253
treaty. Texas—the sole exception—was admitted to statehood
immediately, pursuant to the allegedly clear text of the Admissions
254
Clause. The proposed annexation of Hawaii followed neither of
these models. Yet annexationists in 1898 confidently announced that
previous territorial acquisitions had decisively resolved the present
question of constitutional power.
a. Dueling Understandings of the Texas Precedent. There were
more and less disciplined versions of this argument from historical
practice. Less laudably, annexationists pommeled a straw man. How,
they asked, could anyone seriously argue that the United States was
powerless to acquire territory? That a nation might extend its
territory was “no longer an open question. . . . [N]or will it ever again
255
become a practical, living question before the American people.”
The federal government had engaged in territorial expansion
256
“repeatedly” since the beginning of the Republic. The power to
annex foreign land had therefore been “settled by this uniform,

251. Id. at 6590 (statement of Sen. Mallory).
252. For interpretations of the General Welfare Clause that would effectively grant
Congress carte blanche and eviscerate the idea of great powers, see id. at 5892 (statement of
Rep. Pearce), id. at 5910 (statement of Rep. Barham), and id. at 6334 (statement of Sen.
Foraker). General Welfare Clause textualism is actually more legislatively enabling than the
theory of powers inherent in sovereignty, because not all convenient or advantageous powers
can be plausibly said to reside in the United States by virtue of nationhood.
253. See supra notes 143–45, 224 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 128, 167–68 and accompanying text.
255. 31 CONG. REC. 5840 (1898) (statement of Rep. Henry).
256. Id.
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257

unbroken practice for almost a century.” “[O]nly the antediluvian”
258
would dispute the nation’s ability to acquire new territory.
Of course, no one disputed the United States’ power to acquire
territory through treaty. Critics demanded a demonstration that
Congress could constitutionally acquire foreign territory (at least
259
without promptly admitting it to statehood). Rather than point to
any particular constitutional warrant, annexationists paraded their allsufficient talisman: Texas. Even before the lengthy House and Senate
debates throughout the summer of 1898, a Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report insisted that Congress could constitutionally
acquire Hawaii “under the precedent that was established in the
260
annexation of Texas.”
The Committee claimed that Texas’s
annexation through joint resolution “clearly establishes the precedent
that Congress has the power to annex a foreign State to the territory
261
of the United States.” But the Committee failed to elaborate on the
commonly understood constitutional justification for annexing Texas,
technical conformity with the Admissions Clause; doing so would
have undermined the precedential value of American history’s sole
instance of legislative annexation.

257. Id. at 5890 (statement of Rep. Grow).
258. Id. at 5981 (statement of Rep. Parker); see id. at 5892 (statement of Rep. Pearce) (“I
had supposed until this hour that the right of annexing foreign territory was a settled question
and not open to further discussion.”); id. at 5908 (statement of Rep. Hamilton) (“The
Constitution of the United States has been interpreted many times in favor of the general power
of annexation. . . . This is no new question.”); id. at 5919 (statement of Rep. Bromwell)
(“[T]hese questions are not new and have all been settled by the highest authorities known to
our system of government. . . . [W]e commenced such annexation in the very infancy of our
Republic and have continued in that policy down to the present time.”); id. at 5932 (statement
of Rep. Davidson) (“[T]he same question has been raised five times during our national
history. . . . [I]t has been passed upon and overruled, so that it now has no standing in court.”);
id. at 5981 (statement of Rep. Parker) (“It is rather late to talk about the constitutional power of
the United States to annex territory.”); id. at 5991 (statement of Rep. Graff) (“Our right under
the Constitution to acquire territory . . . has been too well established by precedents in our own
history to be questioned.”); id. at 6010 (statement of Rep. Todd) (“[H]appily we have many
high constitutional authorities as well as historic precedents for the proposed annexation.”); id.
at 6369 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“It is a settled constitutional doctrine in this country that
the power to acquire territory exists. It has been exercised for a hundred years, and it is settled.
Some things get settled by practice, by precedent. It has been settled beyond controversy, and
no court will ever deny it.”).
259. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
260. S. REP. NO. 55-681 (1898) [hereinafter HAWAII REPORT], in 7 REPORTS OF
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 176, at 189, 189; see also Kmiec, supra note
27, at 19 (“Congress acted in explicit reliance on the procedure followed for the acquisition of
Texas.”).
261. HAWAII REPORT, supra note 260, at 190.
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Several annexationist congressmen likewise invoked Texas,
improving (if only slightly) on their belabored argument from the
United States government’s periodic practices. Texas was admitted
“over a new legislative highway which has been blazed so wide and so
straight that in the present emergency we have a precedent ample
262
indeed.” In essence, “the Texas precedent has made the votes of a
majority of both branches of Congress sufficient” to annex foreign
263
territory. That earlier episode “is on all fours with the very question
we are now debating,” right down to the failed treaties and course264
265
correcting joint resolutions. Congress had done all of this before;
of course annexing Hawaii would be constitutional.
But Texas was distinguishable in a constitutionally material
266
sense: “it was admitted as a State and not as a Territory.”
Proponents of annexing Texas had rested on their scrupulously literal
compliance with the Admissions Clause—they indisputably proposed
267
that Congress admit a new state.
But congressman after
congressman grumbled that the resolution to annex Hawaii would not
similarly admit those islands as a state, so Texas was no precedent at
268
all. If anything, it undermined the constitutional case for Hawaii’s
262. 31 CONG. REC. 6005 (1898) (statement of Rep. William Smith).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 6572 (statement of Sen. Pettus).
265. For other invocations of the 1845 joint resolution’s precedential status, see id. at 5877
(statement of Rep. Grosvenor), id. at 5890 (statement of Rep. Grow), id. at 5911 (statement of
Rep. Barham), and id. at 5991 (statement of Rep. Graff).
266. Id. at 5920 (statement of Rep. Crumpacker); see also ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 504 (1936) (“[T]he method of annexing
Texas did not constitute a proper precedent for the annexation of a land and people to be
retained as a possession or in a territorial condition.”); Kmiec, supra note 27, at 20 (“The stated
justification for the joint resolution [annexing Hawaii]—the previous acquisition of Texas—
simply ignores the reliance the 1845 Congress placed on its power to admit new states.”);
Palfrey, supra note 111, at 398 (“The [annexation] power . . . cannot properly be claimed under
the express provision for the admission of new states.”); Stillman, supra note 193, at 378
(“[T]here is no analogy between the admission of Texas into the Union as a State, and the
annexation of Hawaii to this country as a Territory by a joint resolution of Congress.”).
267. See supra note 128.
268. See 31 CONG. REC. 5778 (1898) (statement of Rep. Dinsmore) (“You must admit [it]
as a State. . . . [I]t is feeble of gentlemen to cite Texas as authority for the procedure asked in
this present emergency.”); id. at 5935 (statement of Rep. Broussard) (“[N]or can [Texas] be
quoted as a precedent for this ‘scheme,’ for it is not here sought to admit Hawaii into the Union
as a new State.”); id. at 5976 (statement of Rep. Ball) (“[T]he advocates of this measure have no
ground to stand upon so far as the annexation of Texas is concerned.”); id. at 6013 (statement of
Rep. Williams) (“Texas was not ‘annexed’ in the sense in which we to-day are talking about
‘annexing’ Hawaii. Texas came into this Union by joint resolution under an express power given
to Congress in the Constitution, ‘to admit new States.’”); id. at 6148 (statement of Sen. Bacon)
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annexation, because Congress presumably admitted Texas as a state
precisely because the Constitution excluded the customary territorial
269
path as an option.
Once annexationists’ cursory claims were swept away,
congressmen would see that “never in the history of the country ha[d]
270
territory been admitted as such by joint resolution.” Annexationists
271
attempted a “novel and unprecedented proceeding.” Acquiring
foreign land outside constitutional limitations was, if nothing else, “a
clear departure from American traditions” and an “open
272
abandonment of American precedents.” In fact, annexationists’
initial preference for the treaty form revealed their sympathy with
this restrained vision of Congress’s annexation power: If Texas stood
for the proposition that Congress may annex foreign territory under
any circumstances, why risk the humiliation of another botched
supermajority ratification? Why not simply introduce a joint
resolution from the outset if that device was clearly constitutional
(and ultimately chosen)? Annexationists never marshaled a
satisfactory response.
b. Annexationists’ Flawed “Greater Includes the Lesser”
Argument. Annexationists answered with a second reason why the
Texas precedent legitimated Hawaii’s annexation, one that avoided
contestable premises about the scope of historical practice. In short,
the greater includes the lesser: given that Congress may lawfully
annex and admit foreign territory directly to statehood, surely it may

(noting a constitutional “distinction between the authority of Congress to admit a State . . . and
the power to acquire foreign territory not for the purpose of making it a State”); id. at 6405
(statement of Sen. Caffery) (“They have not followed the precedent. Take Hawaii in her
Statehood, such as it may be, if you want to follow the precedent.”); id. at 6518 (statement of
Sen. Bates) (“‘[A]nalogous facts’ must sustain the application of a precedent. Between the
annexation of Texas and the proposed annexation of Hawaii there are no analogous facts.”); id.
at 6587 (statement of Sen. Spooner) (“Texas was not a Territory. . . . [W]here has Congress ever
admitted a Territory as a Territory?”); id. at 6667 (statement of Sen. Lindsay) (“Congress
admitted [Texas] not as mere territory, but as a sovereign State. . . . This much this precedent
establishes. It does not go a single step beyond the admission of an organized Republic as a
State under the express grant of power by the Constitution to the Congress to admit new
States.”).
269. Congressman Thomas Ball, a Texan, suggested that Congress chose to treat Texas
differently than previous territorial acquisitions “for the purpose alone of coming within the
constitutional power to admit new States.” Id. at 5976 (statement of Rep. Ball).
270. Id. at 5920 (statement of Rep. Crumpacker).
271. Id. at 6518 (statement of Sen. Bates).
272. Id. at 6668 (statement of Sen. Lindsay).
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merely acquire such territory to create a less momentous (and more
273
easily dissoluble) political connection. Just because Congress had
not yet annexed alien territory to an “inferior relation, it does not
follow that we have not that power when we have exercised the
274
greater power.” It would take “some lawyer” to explain why “the
exercise of the power which admits a State to that high relation . . .
275
can not acquire territory out of which a State can be created.”
This greater-includes-the-lesser argument exploited opponents’
pragmatic concession of Texas’s constitutionality. But to the
disinterested student of American constitutionalism, it gets the
inquiry exactly backward. Because the Admissions Clause is facially
ambiguous—may Congress admit any pocket of earth to statehood, or
just presently owned U.S. territory?—analyzing the “lesser” issue of
annexation first can help decide which interpretation of the “greater”
Admissions power to adopt. If, on the best reading of the
Constitution, Congress may not constitutionally enlarge our national
boundaries (whether or not it simultaneously increases the pool of
states), then Congress may not increase the pool of states through an
enlargement of our national boundaries.
In other words, we should prefer an interpretation of the
Admissions Clause that accommodates a more constitutionally
coherent greater-includes-the-lesser argument. The annexationists of
1898 should not have invoked Texas to bootstrap their way into
constitutionality without some textual warrant for Hawaii’s legislative
acquisition as a territory. Without Texas, Hawaii’s annexation was
276
constitutionally indefensible.
This stark truth reveals the
unsoundness of an interpretation of the Admissions Clause that
rendered Hawaii’s annexation plainly constitutional on greaterincludes-the-lesser grounds.
Once opponents of annexing Hawaii assumed Texas’s
constitutionality, they deprived themselves of the ability to oppose

273. Id. at 5910–11 (statement of Rep. Barham); see id. at 6148 (statement of Sen. Elkins)
(asking “why, if [Congress] can admit a State, it can not admit anything less than a State”).
274. Id. at 6587 (statement of Sen. Teller).
275. Id.
276. See Kmiec, supra note 27, at 20–21 (concluding that “[i]t is . . . unclear which
constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution”). To be
sure, acquiring Hawaii must have greatly facilitated Congress’s ability to “provide and maintain
a Navy.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. But if annexation is too important to be discovered
through implication, it is irrelevant which enumerated power might profit from a great-powers
violation.
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annexation on great-powers grounds. Instead, they were left to
protest the apparent lack of an annexation power under traditional
277
modes of inquiry. By conceding that the Constitution did expressly
permit legislative annexation in some instances, these opponents
assumed the enormous burden of explaining why the lesser power to
annex foreign territory was not included within the Article IV,
Section 3 power to annex foreign territory and admit it to statehood.
Conceding Texas’s constitutionality avoided a messy and futile
struggle, to be sure, and enabled opponents to draw attention to
annexationists’ chief vulnerability: that Hawaii fell outside the
278
Admissions Clause rationale for acquiring Texas. But Hawaii was
ultimately annexed, and the modern Supreme Court has implicitly
acknowledged the validity of statutory annexation under a greater279
includes-the-lesser theory. The annexation of Hawaii therefore
represents an unfortunate road not taken in the life of great powers—
a missed opportunity for a group of conscientious constitutional
dissenters to explicate a vital structural precept that now figures to
play a leading role in constitutional law.
c. The Overlap Between Alleged Inherent Powers and Great
Powers. These scholarly squabbles over inherent and enumerated
congressional power did, however, contribute something to greatpowers theory. Annexationists evidently invoked alleged sovereign
prerogatives because their claimed power was not enumerated and
could not be fairly characterized as merely incidental to one or more
granted powers. As Professor Baude has noted, the Supreme Court
originally sustained a federal eminent-domain power through

277. Writing in the Green Bag in 1898, James W. Stillman concluded that “the action of
Congress . . . was entirely without constitutional authority” because “there is no provision of the
Constitution authorizing the passage of the joint resolution in question.” Stillman, supra note
193, at 375, 378. Somewhat more opaquely, former Secretary of State John W. Foster later
recalled that Hawaii’s annexation was “repugnant” to him “because of its evasion of the
constitutional provision.” FOSTER, supra note 227, at 174.
278. See supra notes 266–68.
279. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), a landmark case on whether habeas
corpus protections extend to Guantánamo Bay detainees, all nine Justices assumed that
Congress may annex foreign territory under the Admissions Clause. See id. at 765 (asserting that
“[t]he Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and
govern territory”); id. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Insular Cases all concerned Territories
[including Hawaii] acquired by Congress under its Article IV authority . . . .”). Justice Kennedy
wrote for a five-Justice majority, and three Justices joined Justice Scalia’s dissent.
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identical considerations of inherent power and national sovereignty.
The Court concluded that “[s]uch an authority is essential to [the
United States’] independent existence and perpetuity. . . . The right is
the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from
281
sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law.” But the
concept of inherent powers cannot be squared with the idea of great
powers, which assumes that every congressional power (great or not)
282
ultimately owes its existence to the Constitution’s text.
If
annexation and eminent domain are any indication, congressional
powers that have historically been justified through reference to
unfalsifiable assertions of national sovereignty are especially apt to be
283
categorized as great powers.
III. THE FUTURE OF GREAT POWERS
This Note’s identification of territorial annexation as a great
power highlights two essential avenues for future research. First,
because judges will not (and should not) declare Texas and Hawaii
unconstitutional, the legal community must offer a credible
justification for applying the great-powers doctrine inconsistently if it
is to flourish as a judicially administrable principle. And second, the
Texas-annexation debates demonstrate that legal actors have
squarely confronted great-powers limitations without summoning
284
McCulloch’s famed terminology. It is therefore an open question
whether the Supreme Court actually issued any great-powers holdings
between McCulloch and NFIB. In fact, under a newly persuasive
reading of Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court has actually decided that
280. See Baude, supra note 5, at 1800–04 (recounting the birth of modern eminent-domain
jurisprudence).
281. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1875); see also United States v. Jones, 109
U.S. 513, 518 (1883) (“The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the
right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of
sovereignty, and . . . requires no constitutional recognition.”); Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional
Aspects of Federal Housing, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 131, 141 (1935) (“[I]n relation to the eminent
domain power the ‘necessary and proper’ clause merely recognizes a universal attribute of
governments, that of being able to obtain by expropriation the lands they require for the
carrying out of their powers.”).
282. See supra note 236.
283. For one scholar’s list of alleged “inherent sovereign powers construed as ancillary to
enumerated powers” (but without reference to great-powers limitations), see Gerald L.
Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82,
83 (2004).
284. For a comprehensive list of McCulloch’s great-powers language, see supra notes 63–69
and accompanying text.
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involuntary expatriation (citizenship-stripping) is too important a
power to have been granted to Congress implicitly.
A. The Need To Justify Inconsistent Application of Great-Powers
Principles
Professor Koppelman is right: “It is . . . an open question how
much of existing law would have to be scrapped if [the great-powers
285
idea] were adopted by the courts.” In such a world, judges would
strike down any exercise of an implied power that seemed too
286
important to exist without being enumerated (or perhaps that
reached more broadly than the enumerated power it purported to
287
effectuate).
For example, the unenumerated (but plenary)
congressional power to control immigration, even to the point of
excluding entire ethnic groups, sure seems more important than the
enumerated power to specify standardized procedures by which
288
individual aliens may become American citizens.
Likewise,
Congress’s unwritten power to print vast sums of paper money is not
289
clearly inferior to its enumerated power to “coin” money. And
perhaps both of these powers are simply too far-reaching to be
290
exercised through implication.
In any case, redefining the United States through territorial
enlargements is as great, substantive, and independent as powers
come. And even if reasonable minds could differ on the perceived
importance of annexing foreign territory, Roberts’s NFIB opinion
would prohibit the Hawaii two-step, whereby Congress uses an
unenumerated power (acquiring foreign land) to create the necessary

285. Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 113. For Koppelman’s somewhat
extravagant effort to compile a list of possible great powers, see Koppelman, Everybody, supra
note 13, at 519–20 (citations omitted).
286. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
288. See Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 113, 117 (identifying
immigration control as a probable great power under Roberts’s framework). Not surprisingly,
the Court early on denied the necessity of enumerating this power: “[E]very sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705
(1893) (quoting Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 520.
290. See Ajit V. Pai, Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR. L.
REV. 535, 557 n.133 (1998) (suggesting that the creation of legal-tender notes is too important to
be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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predicate for the eventual exercise of an enumerated power
291
(admitting new states).
The example of annexation vividly demonstrates that judges
cannot apply the great-powers doctrine consistently across the full
range of possible scenarios, Koppelman’s alarmism notwithstanding.
This is understandable, since they have inherited a jurisprudence—
and a political history—that rarely strained to ensure that implied
powers were truly incidental to associated enumerated powers and
292
were not too important to have been granted by implication. But in
championing this Rip Van Winkle of constitutional law, great-powers
practitioners must tread carefully to avoid a trenchant critique leveled
at judicial originalism: that the selective granting of indulgences
corrupts the concept’s normative rigor and so spoils its intellectual
293
appeal.
This Note does not aim to delegitimize Texas’s or Hawaii’s
present political status, retroactively negate their federal
officeholders’ votes, or inaugurate an intellectually respectable
294
“birther” movement.
These oddly linked states are “deeply
295
embedded into our law and lives,” and their legality is “no longer a
296
viable issue for courts to decide.” Texas and Hawaii must therefore
297
remain “pragmatic exception[s]” to the consistent application of
great-powers principles. This Note has aimed to show that, barring an
unlikely constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to acquire
foreign land, the doctrine will always be beset by at least this glaring
inconsistency.
Few governmental practices are as deeply entrenched as the
components of our national Union. It may be politically conceivable
to invalidate less foundational arrangements on great-powers

291. See supra notes 80–81.
292. The aforementioned annexation episodes are Exhibits A and B, at least with respect to
the second point.
293. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 8–9 (2011) (arguing that so-called “fainthearted” originalism “undercuts the claim that legitimacy comes from adhering to the original
meaning of the text adopted by the framers”).
294. For an amusingly bookish effort to demonstrate that President Obama was not actually
born in Hawaii, see generally JEROME R. CORSI, WHERE’S THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE?: THE
CASE THAT BARACK OBAMA IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO BE PRESIDENT (2011).
295. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006). Gerhardt
was describing especially canonical judicial decisions, but his language also applies here.
296. Id. at 1206.
297. Scalia, supra note 39, at 140.
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298

grounds, though practically impossible to eliminate others. But
regardless of where the line is drawn, proponents of the great-powers
doctrine must offer a principled justification for following their best
understanding of the Constitution’s meaning only sometimes; they
must articulate sufficiently nonarbitrary criteria for subjecting only
some offending practices to NFIB’s great-powers scrutiny.
B. Digging Deeper: Involuntary Expatriation as a Hidden Great
Power
299

300

As Baude and Robert Natelson have shown, the great-powers
concept has a much richer intellectual history than NFIB readers may
have initially realized. It seems extremely improbable that a structural
principle so theoretically sensible, so substantiated by Founding-era
legal authorities, must have taken a two-hundred-year vacation after
McCulloch merely because the phrase “great substantive and
301
independent” yields almost no search results. The Texas debates
support my instinct: in one of the most dramatic and constitutionally
302
erudite legislative exchanges in American history, great powers
played a starring role—but without appropriating Marshall’s most
recognizable expression.
In the era of searchable digital archives, easy congressional
targets may still exist. For example, at least one senator parsed the
constitutionality of the Freedmen’s Bureau using the familiar
Marshallian language of principals and incidents:

298. For example, in NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts cast doubt on the constitutionality of the
ACA’s minimum-coverage provision by claiming that “Congress ha[d] never attempted to rely
on th[e] power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted
product.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).
299. See generally Baude, supra note 5 (cataloguing prominent Founders’ endorsement of
great-powers principles and attempting to explain widespread resistance to a federal eminentdomain power in the antebellum era).
300. See generally Natelson, supra note 43 (contending that the Necessary and Proper
Clause incorporated the agency-law concept of incidental powers).
301. For two obscure exceptions in the U.S. Reports, see supra note 12.
302. See Maltz, supra note 125, at 381, 399 (observing that the Texas debates “raise[d]
fundamental questions about the structure of the nation” and that “[t]he depth and
sophistication of the constitutional analysis was often extremely impressive”). The decision to
annex Hawaii also featured “one of the greatest debates in American congressional history.”
TYLER DENNETT, AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH REFERENCE TO CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA IN THE 19TH CENTURY 624
(1922).
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[The Thirteenth Amendment] does not enumerate the power to
establish a Freedmen’s Bureau as a constitutional power; it does not
expressly confer on Congress the power to create a Freedmen’s
Bureau. Then, if such a power exist[s], like the power to establish a
bank, it is an implied power. It is not a ‘substantive, independent
power,’ for the execution of which other and incidental powers may
be invoked; but it is itself an incidental power, to be used only to
303
execute some other and an express or enumerated power.

But as jurists and scholars begin to categorize congressional
304
305
powers as “vast” and “inferior” after NFIB and Kebodeaux, the
most immediately relevant materials will be any Supreme Court
opinions clarifying the doctrine’s contours. The conventional wisdom
holds that zero majority opinions said much of anything about great
306
powers from 1819 to 2012. In his recent Harvard Law Review
Foreword, for example, Professor John Manning claimed that “in no
case has the Court ever invalidated an act of Congress on the ground
that it employed a ‘great substantive and independent power,’ in
307
contravention of the Necessary and Proper Clause.” But if the
evidentiary lens is widened beyond the narrow linguistic core of
“great substantive and independent power[s],” noncanonical
necessary-and-proper cases may nonetheless reveal a Court mindful
of enumeration’s role in the American constitutional system and
cautious of sustaining legislation that would destroy the distinction
between great and incidental powers.
308
Consider Afroyim v. Rusk, which held that Congress is
powerless to expunge U.S. citizenship absent voluntary renunciation
309
of that citizenship. The Court had recently upheld a federal
expatriation statute as the exercise of a power inherent in
310
sovereignty. But in Afroyim, the Court sharply reversed course. It

303. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 934 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis).
Unfortunately, Senator Davis seems to have misunderstood the idea of great powers: he
wrongly assumed that a power is not “substantive” and “independent” unless it is enumerated.
304. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819).
305. Id.
306. Five such scholarly expressions are cited above. See supra notes 13, 40 and
accompanying text.
307. Manning, supra note 40, at 59 n.349.
308. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
309. Id. at 257.
310. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (concluding that the ability to expatriate
U.S. citizens is a “power[] indispensable to . . . functioning effectively in the company of

RICE IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/2/2014 10:37 PM

TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION

765

began by insisting that Congress may never exercise a power merely
because it is thought to be “an implied attribute of sovereignty
311
possessed by all nations.” “Our Constitution governs us,” and it
“limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those
that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted
312
ones.” Crucially, Article I enumerates no citizenship-stripping
313
power.
Could such a power be implied, then? The Court favorably
quoted Congressman William Lowndes’s remarks from an 1818
debate on a proposed bill concerning voluntary expatriation: “[I]f the
Constitution had intended to give to Congress so delicate a power, it
would have been expressly granted. That it was a delicate power, and
314
ought not to be loosely inferred, . . . appeared in a strong light.” For
Congressman Lowndes, “delicate” meant “great”; even the power to
prescribe the conditions by which individuals could voluntarily
relinquish their citizenship was too important to be left to implication.
The Court took precisely this approach as to involuntary
expatriation. It remarked that “[c]itizenship is no light trifle to be
jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under . . . implied
315
grants of power.” The consequences were too important, too grave:
“In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left
without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world—as a
316
man without a country.” It would be “completely incongruous” to
allow temporary majorities to “forcibl[y] destr[oy]” the bonds that
317
unite full-fledged Americans to their government.
Afroyim’s
reasoning closely tracked one lawyer’s striking assertion in the
Harvard Law Review seven years earlier: “The right to destroy the
citizenship of one of the sovereign people is ‘a great substantive and
independent power’ within Chief Justice Marshall’s meaning. It is not

sovereign nations”), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); id. (“[T]here can
be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation.”).
311. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Id.
314. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1050 (1818) (statement of Rep. Lowndes) (quoted in Afroyim,
387 U.S. at 260).
315. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267–68; cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959)
(expressing the “Court’s concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by
implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation’s lawmakers”).
316. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
317. Id.
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an incidental power which can reasonably be inferred from a more
318
explicit one.”
Afroyim demanded more than a “rational nexus” or “relevant
319
connection”
between unwritten means and enumerated ends.
Rather, involuntary expatriation’s weighty consequences—
320
“[c]itizenship is no light trifle” —inspired the Court’s unwillingness
321
to imply the power through the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Afroyim is, at the very least, a first cousin of McCulloch, NFIB, and
Kebodeaux. Continued research will likely reveal a much larger
322
immediate family than anyone has yet realized.
CONCLUSION
In 2004, Professor Lawson coauthored a marvelous book on the
323
In it,
constitutional basis for American territorial expansion.
Lawson and Professor Guy Seidman relied on a somewhat permissive
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause (“the Sweeping
324
Clause” ) to deny any constitutional deficiency in the congressional
325
326
annexations of Texas and Hawaii. The perceived importance of
annexing foreign land appeared nowhere in their analysis. Instead,
they reasoned that Congress may admit alien territory directly to
318. Leonard B. Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1510, 1526 (1960).
319. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967).
320. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267.
321. One contemporaneous observer drew this very conclusion. See Warren B. Elterman,
Comment, An Expatriation Enigma: Afroyim v. Rusk, 48 B.U. L. REV. 295, 300 (1968)
(interpreting Afroyim to hold that “a power of this dimension is unsuitable for implication
under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause or any other general grant of power”).
322. For starters, Baude has argued that “[w]hen adjudicating modern federalism cases, the
Supreme Court increasingly invokes a version of the great powers argument, but without a
thorough explanation (or even obvious awareness) of the roots of the idea it is invoking.”
Baude, supra note 5, at 1815.
323. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111.
324. Id. at 93.
325. See id. at 91 (“[F]ew acquisitions were as constitutionally unproblematic.”); id. at 92
(“The case for the constitutionality of annexation by legislation is actually quite simple.”); id. at
93 (“[T]he annexation of Texas by statute was entirely constitutional.”).
326. See id. at 109 (“The only potentially relevant difference between the annexation of
Hawaii and the prior annexation of Texas was that Texas entered the United States as a state,
while Hawaii entered as a territory. That is not a difference of constitutional dimension. As a
matter of domestic American law, ordinary legislation is always sufficient for the acquisition of
property as long as the acquisition carries into effect a constitutionally granted power, such as
the admissions power.”).
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statehood under the literal words of the Admissions Clause, or to the
status of a federal territory as a means of implementing the
327
Admissions power.
But in 2013, Lawson published a confession that seems to
undercut his earlier analyses: “[T]he present author is moderately
ashamed to admit that he did not understand the import of this
[“great substantive and independent power”] language until a few
short years ago, when it was made clear to him by Robert
328
Natelson.” This crosscutting concept “is an incredibly important
329
idea that was in danger of getting lost.” Unfortunately, it played no
role in the most comprehensive scholarly treatment of territorial
expansion and the Constitution—Lawson’s own book.
Now that Chief Justice Roberts has restored the great-powers
concept to the American legal consciousness, the constitutionality of
annexing foreign territory by statute must be rethought. Opponents
of acquiring Texas explicitly claimed that statutory annexation was
too important to be inferred through the Necessary and Proper
330
Clause, and they proffered a splendid textual and structural defense
331
The government’s uniform reliance on
of that position.
treatymaking before 1845’s fateful joint resolution only strengthened
332
that case. And reasoning entirely from first principles, territorial
annexation is so plainly important—so nation-altering—that it is
333
exactly the sort of “great object[]” that should not be inferred as
merely incidental to a more dignified power grant. It is “entirely
334
reasonable to expect that power to be dealt with on its own terms.”
One need not consider land acquisition to be “particularly
335
scary” to agree that scholars and judges should know where this
alluring concept might lead them. Like any constitutional doctrine,
327. Id. at 94; see also Palfrey, supra note 111, at 398 (“[I]n no case . . . could it be properly
said that annexation was so remote from any permissible end of legislation—regulation of
commerce, for instance, or provision for defence—that it could not have been a ‘necessary and
proper’ means to that end.”).
328. Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and the Zombie
Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1704 (2013).
329. Id. at 1707.
330. See supra Part II.A.1.
331. See supra Part II.A.1–.2.
332. See supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text.
333. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819).
334. Baude, supra note 5, at 1754.
335. Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 118; see Kopel, supra note 24, at
264 (“[I]t’s only Koppelman who thinks that scariness is part of the test.”).
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“great substantive and independent power[s]” augurs briar patches as
well as strawberry fields. Justifying the doctrine’s inevitably
inconsistent application will be critical to its achieving widespread
purchase as a judicially administrable principle. But this doctrinal
conversation cannot flourish unless scholars continue to uncover the
hidden history of great powers. This Note represents an early effort to
plot that concept’s parameters.

